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INTRODUCTION

It is abundantly clear that when an injury to an' employee is
determined to be covered by a workers' compensation act and the
employer has acted with ordinary negligence, the statutorily prescribed
compensation is the sole remedy and any recovery against the employer
in tort is barred.' An employer's immunity from common-law liability
2
under such circumstances is unqualified and virtually absolute. It is
also clear that an employer's agents are likewise afforded protection
under the shield of immunity for negligent conduct by virtue of the
exclusive-remedy provisions of most workers' compensation acts. 3 It is
not so clear, however, that the exclusive-remedy provisions of North
Dakota's Workers' Compensation Act were designed or intended to be
construed in a fashion to bar an injured employee's common-law action
when an employer or fellow servant has acted with the intention of
4
causing harm by physically assaulting an employee.
Although certainly not purporting to be an exhaustive analysis, this
article will examine the current state of the law with respect to the
compensability of workplace assaults. The analysis regarding the
compensability of such assaults serves as a necessary predicate for the

i. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW oFTORTS § 80, at 574 (5th ed.
1984). See, e.g., Stine v. Weiner, 238 N.W.2d 918, 925 (N.D. 1976) (ruling that the exclusive-remedy
provisions of the North Dakota Workers' Compensation Act effectively bar any otherwise
maintainable common-law action).
2. See Peak v. Small Business Administration, 666 F.2d 1121, 1122 (8th Cir. 1981) (adhering to
the notion that an action under workers' compensation is one of "strict liability").
3. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-08 (1985). See also Gabriel v. Minnesota Mut. Fire & Casualty,
506 N.W.2d 73, 77 (N.D. 1993); Stuhlmiller v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 475 N.W.2d 136, 138 (N.D.
1991); Hulne v. International Harvester, Co. 496 F. Supp. 849, 852 (D.N.D. 1980); Latendresse v.
Preskey, 290 N.W.2d 267, 270 (N.D. 1980); Schlenk v. Aerial Contractors, Inc., 268 N.W.2d 466, 471
(N.D. 1978); Stine v. Weiner, 238 N.W.2d 918, 925 (N.D. 1976) (noting that it is well established that
a common-law action against a co-employee is barred by the exclusive-remedy provisions of North
Dakota's Workers' Compensation Act). The rationale for extending the shield of immunity to
co-employees or fellow servants rests in part upon the notion that since "the employee's own
negligence ... does not defeat compensation for his injuries, then certainly it cannot be held that the
negligence of his fellow workman, or that disobedience of a fellow workman to the employer's
directions, can defeat compensation to'the injured workman." Badger Furniture Co. v. Champeau, 217
N.W. 734, 736 (Wis. 1928). Therefore, it would appear appropriate that the shield of immunity should
likewise be extended since the question of whether the employer, the employee, or a fellow employee
is guilty of negligence is immaterial for compensation purposes. See infra notes 126-131 &
accompanying text.
4. The focus of this article is on those workplace assaults which occur between either
co-workers or between an employer and a subordinate. Common law tort actions in which an injured
employee attempts to hold an employer vicariously liable for the actions of his servants are, for the
most part, not contemplated by this article. Additionally, assaults perpetrated upon an employee by
third parties who have no connection with the particular employment are, for the most part, beyond the
intended scope of this article, as are the rules and cases regarding "horseplay."
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resolution of an ultimate issue. The ultimate issue being: whether an
employee who is the subject of an intentional assault may proceed in tort
against an employer or fellow servant 5 directly for the injuries sustained,
or whether that employee will be barred from maintaining an action at
law due to the exclusive-remedy provisions of North Dakota's Workers'
Compensation Act.
The article begins by providing a brief perspective on the historical
development of workers' compensation law in the United States. In
setting the stage for resolving the ultimate issue as previously articulated,
the article proceeds to trace the development of compensable
work-related assaults. It next highlights specific categories of assaults
which still seem to pose problems for judicial decisionmakers when
making compensability determinations. The final scene consists of
turning the tables and examining a battered employee's prospects for
maintaining a common-law action in North Dakota directly against the
battering employer or fellow servant. The satisfactory resolution of this
inquiry is made in light of very broad language in the exclusive-remedy
provisions of the North Dakota Workers' Compensation Act which at first
blush appear to effectively bar virtually any common-law action. The
article highlights general rules which have emerged and discusses North
Dakota authority highly relevant to the settlement of the issue. In
attempting to provide a logical and equitable basis for its resolution, the
article concludes by suggesting the codification of an exception to the
rule of exclusivity for a narrow category of employment-related injuries.
II.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Workers' compensation legislation in America emerged from
conditions created by modem industrial development, coupled with the
inability of remedies provided by the common law to adequately cope
with injuries suffered by workers. 6 The dissatisfaction with the tort
system's fault-based method of compensating injured workers for

5. The terms "fellow servant." "co-worker," and "co-employee" are used interchangeably in this
article and include supervisors.
6. 82 AM. JUR. 2D Workers' Compensation § 1 (1992). The common law was largely ineffectual
in resolving those disputes between an employee and employer regarding workplace injuries. Larry
Kraft, The North Dakota Equity for Tortfeasors Struggle-Judicial Action vs. Legislative
Over-Reaction, 56 N.D. L. REv. 67, 82 (1979). It has been estimated that between seventy and
ninety-four percent of industrial accidents under the common-law system went completely
uncompensated. KEErON ET AL., supra note 1 § 80, at 572 n.43 (citing various authorities). During the
late nineteenth century, uncompensated industrial accidents had reached such alarming proportions
that communities found it necessary to support "large numbers of maimed workers and their families
as public charges." Leslie Hertz Kawaler, Note, Intentional Torts Under Workers' Compensation
Statutes: A Blessing ora Burden?, 12 HosRAl L. REv. 181, 183 (1983):
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personal injuries brought about by work-related 7 accidents prompted
every jurisdiction in the United States to promulgate comprehensive
workers' compensation legislation. 8
Workers' compensation effectively substitutes the concept of fault with
the principle of compensation. The correlative rights and obligations of
employers and employees under the compensation scheme are fixed by
statutes which usually mandate compulsory coverage, and generally any
employee covered by the statutory scheme is automatically entitled to
compensation for work-related injuries. 9 The boundaries of coverage
are marked and distinctively defined by a "coverage formula" contained
in all compensation acts. 10 However, the right to compensation benefits
is in all cases and under all acts dependent upon the relationship of the
particular injury to an employee's work.
It is clear that the introduction of workers' compensation legislation
has radically changed the law of employer liability. Moreover, because
the common law left most work-related injuries uncompensated, the
transition from a common-law remedy to an exclusive remedy under
workers' compensation acts was not a significant sacrifice for workers. 11
Prior to workers' compensation, recovery under the common law hinged

7. "Work-related' as used in this article refers to those injuries which both "arise out of the
employment' and occur while the employee was acting "in the course of employment." Additionally,
the terms 'employer" and "employee' are used throughout this article without more than cursory
reference. Although meant to be used in the traditional and ordinary sense herein, it should be noted
that the terms are significant to the threshold requirement of compensability and have specific
meanings within the provisions of workers' compensation acts. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE §
65-01-02(15) & (16) (Supp. 1993). The relationship of employer and employee must exist in order to
entitle a claimant to recover in a proceeding for compensation. Schaefer v. North Dakota Workers'
Compensation Bureau, 462 N.W.2d 179, 18Q (N.D. 1990); Starkenberg v. North Dakota Workmen's
Compensation Bureau. 13 N.W.2d 395. 397 (N.D. 1944) (noting that an injured worker must be an
'employee' in order to make the Act applicable); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. State, 298 N.W. 773. 777
(N.D. 1941).
8. Jean C. Love, Actions for Nonphysical Harm, RelationshipBetween Tort System and No-Fault
Compensation (With an Emphasis on Worker's Compensation). 73 CAL. L. REV. 857, 857 (1985).
Although the seeds to a consciously enlightened social policy for workplace injuries can arguably be
traced to the early 1100's. I ARTHUR LARSON, THELAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 4.10. at 2-1 &
2-2 (1990), the "compensation movement" originated in Germany with the adoption of the German
Compensation Act of 1884. JOSEPH W. LrrrLE ET AL., WORKERS' COMPENSATION 46 (3d ed. 1993). It
was, however, England's Workmen's Compensation Act of 1897 which in many respects served as the
model for subsequent American acts. See Richard A. Epstein, The HistoricalOrigins and Economic
Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 GA. L. REV. 775, 797 (1982). All but eight states had
enacted compensation acts by 1920, and on January 1. 1949. Mississippi, the final state, adopted its
compensation act. Id. § 5.30. at 39. ContraW. KEErON, Er AL. supra note 1. § 80, at 573 (noting that
Hawaii was the last state to promulgate workers' compensation legislation in 1963). North Dakota
entered into the mainstream movement and promulgated its compensation act in 1919. See 1919 N.D.
LAws ch. 162.
9. Woods v. Hughes Oil Co.. 226 N.W. 586 (N.D. 1929).
10. See, e.g.. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(9) (Supp. 1993).
11. See Dana M. Leonard, Note, Exclusivity Provisionsof Workers' Compensation Statutes: Will
the Dual Injury PrincipleCrack the Wall of Employer Imnunity?, 55 U. CIN. L REV. 549. 549 (1986).
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upon proof of employer negligence, and at least four obstacles existed
which effectively prevented successful actions by workers against their
employers.1 2 First, although the common law imposed duties upon
employers for the protection of employees, those duties were limited,
making a breach of a duty difficult to prove.1 3 Second, even on those
occasions when an employee's injuries resulted from the demonstrated
negligence of the employer, the common-law defenses of the fellow-servant rule, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk were
onerous and therefore usually barred recovery.14 Third, the concomitant
litigation which was a necessary incident to any recovery generally
meant delay, pressure upon the injured worker to settle any claim in
order to merely survive, and exorbitant expenses and attorneys' fees
which often left the worker with only a fraction of any money ultimately
paid.15 Fourth, the recovery of injured workers was further frustrated by
the fact that co-workers often refused to testify against their employers
for fear of losing their jobs. 16

12. Id. at 550. Prior to workers' compensation legislation, an estimated 80% of workers and their
dependents who brought actions seeking compensation for workplace injuries lost their cases. Samuel
B. Horovitz, Assaults and Horseplay Under Worknen's Compensation Laws, 41 NW. U. L. REv. 311,
311 (1946). As one court noted: "More than one-half of all ... suits [at law for work-related injuries]
were lost by the injured employee, and a very considerable per cent of the remainder resulted in little
material help to him." Phil Hollenbach Co. v. Hollenbach, 204 S.W. 152. 156 (Ky. 1918).
13. Leonard, supra note 11, at 550. See KEErON ET AL., supra note 1, § 80, at 569 (classifying the
specific common-law duties imposed on the employer for the protection of employees). The employer
had an advantage under the common-law system because the burden of proving a cause of action was
upon the injured employee. S. Paige Burress, Comment, The Intentional Tort Exception to the
Exclusivity Provision of Workers' Compensation: A Comparison of West Virginia and Ohio Law, 18
OHio N.U. L. REv. 273, 273 (1991).
14. See Zarski v. Creamer, 59 N.E.2d 704, 705 (Mass. 1945) (denying recovery because of the
fellow-servant rule); Schlemmer v. Buffalo, Rochester & Pittsburgh Ry., 220 U.S. 590, 598-99 (1911)
(barring recovery for accidental death because of contributory negligence); Bonner v. Texas Co., 89
F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 1937) (denying recovery for injuries sustained from an explosion despite
apparent defects in working conditions because the risks of the job were assumed by the employee).
15. KEErON Er AL., supra note 1, § 80 at 572-73.
16. Leonard, supra note 11, at 550. The fear of job loss has been vitiated to some extent in a
number of jurisdictions by either statute or judicial creation of a limited class of exceptions to the
"employment-at-will" doctrine. See Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n, 407 N.W.2d 206, 211-12
(N.D. 1987) (acknowledging the public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule). One of
these exceptions is grounded in public policy and prohibits the retaliatory discharge of an employee
for filing a workers' compensation claim. See, e.g., Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d
425, 427-28 (Ind. 1973) (holding that the fear of discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim
"would have a deleterious effect on the exercise of a statutory right[;]" consequently, a retaliatory
discharge is actionable in a court of law despite the exclusive-remedy provisions of a workers'
compensation statute): Springer v. Weeks & Leo Co., 429 N.W.2d 558, 559 (Iowa 1988) (holding that
an employer's discharge of a worker for merely pursuing a statutory right to compensation for a
work-related injury will support a civil claim based upon public policy despite the general rule of
exclusivity); Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793, 794 (N.D. 1987) (opining that
the retaliatory discharge of an employee for seeking workers' compensation violates public policy and.
accordingly, will give grounds for a tort action against the employer). In some jurisdictions grounds
for a tort action for retaliatory discharge will exist despite the fact that the employee was terminated
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Although the advent of workers' compensation legislation by states
marked the removal from the tort system of a large number of lawsuits
brought against employers by injured workers, the statutory regime
represents a codification of a mutual compromise or bargain whereby
both employees and employers surrender certain advantages in
exchange for others. In return for assuming absolute liability (liability
regardless of fault) for all work-related injuries an employee may incur
at a statutorily prescribed amount, 17 the employer under the workers'
compensation act is granted immunity from all common-law actions
based on negligence.' 8 The traditional common-law obstacles of the
fellow-servant rule, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk are
abolished and unavailable as defenses to the employer.19 The injured
employee, in return for surrendering his or her common-law right of
action for negligence, secures relatively swift and certain compensation
for work-related injuries that affords at least nominal relief which might
20
otherwise be unavailable.
In order to effectuate the mutual compromise, compensation acts
generally provide that the benefits recoverable under the act are
"exclusive" of all other remedies available to those employees or their
dependents in cases in which the injuries sustainedfall within the scope

"before" applying for workers' compensation benefits. See Richardson v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 510
N.E.2d 134, 136 (Ii. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that it is not necessary to a cause of action for retaliatory
discharge that the injured worker had "actually" filed a workers' compensation claim while employed);
Wright v. Fiber Indus., Inc., 299 S.E.2d 284, 287 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) (noting that an employee does
not need to file a workers' compensation claim to be protected from retaliatory discharge). But see
Griffey v. Prestige Stamping, Inc., 473 N.W.2d 790, 792 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (ruling that a claim for
retaliatory discharge could not be based upon a discharge because of the employer's anticipation that
the injured worker might file a claim for workers' compensation). See generally Theresa Ludwig
Kruck, Annotation, Recovery for Dischargefrom Employment in Retaliation for Filing Worker's
Compensation Claim, 32 A.L.R.4th 1221 (1984).
17. Workers' compensation statutes contain detailed and elaborate schedules with specific
compensation rates for prescribed injuries which provide some measure of monetary relief which is
less than full compensation. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-05-12, -13 (Supp. 1993).
18. David S. Goldberg, Comment, 17 ST. MARY's L.J. 513, 515 (1986). The real benefit to the
employer under a workers' compensation act is the relief from personal injury liability and the
concomitant risk of a large jury award.
19. See, e.g., Pace v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 201 N.W. 348, 350 (N.D.
1924) (opining that it was the intention of the legislature in enacting the North Dakota Workers'
Compensation Act to ensure that an employee injured in the course of employment recover in cases
regardless of questions of negligence, contributory negligence, or assumption of risk).
20. Goldberg, supra note 18, at 515-16; State v. E.W. Wylie Co., 58 N.W.2d 76, 81 (N.D. 1953).
The remedy afforded by the workers' compensation provisions "was never intended by [even] the
most ardent advocates of workmen's compensation to give full remuneration for loss of wages,
because this would remove much of the inducement of workmen to exercise care and caution, and
would be an inducement to malinger." I WILLIAM R. ScnIER, WOR MEN'S COMPENSATION § 3, at 6 (3d
ed. 1941).
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of the act.2 1 This rule of exclusivity is the cornerstone of the compensation compromise and is enshrined to greater or lesser degrees in every
22
compensation act in America.
The "no-fault" system of workers' compensation, which imposes
unilateral employer liability, is premised in part on a legislative view that
it is economically more efficient for employers to absorb the expense of
work-related injuries as normal costs of doing business since work-related accidents are an inevitable accompaniment of industrial
production. 23 It was also regarded as more equitable for the employer

21. The exclusivity provisions of North Dakota's Workers' Compensation Act are extremely
broad and manifested in sections 65-01-01. 65-01-08, 65-04-28, 65-05-06 of the North Dakota
Century Code. See Smith v. Vestal, 494 N.W.2d 370, 372-73 & n.2 (N.D. 1992) (explaining further
the North Dakota Century Code sections regarding exclusivity). Section 65-01-01 provides:
The state of North Dakota, exercising its police and sovereign powers, declares that the
prosperity of the state depends in a large measure upon the well-being of its wage
workers, and, hence, for workers injured in hazardous employments, and for their
families and dependents, sure and certain relief is hereby provided regardless of
questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding, or
compensation, except as otherwise provided in this title, and to that end, all civil actions
and civil claims for relief for such personal injuries and all jurisdiction of the courts of
the state over such causes are abolished except as is otherwise provided in this title.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-01 (Supp. 1993). Section 65-01-08 provides:
Where a local or out-of-state employer has secured the payment of compensation to his
employees by contributing premiums to the fund, the employee, and the parents of a
minor employee, or the representatives or beneficiaries of either, have no claim for
relief against such contributing employer or against any agent, servant, or other
employee of such employer for damages for personal injuries, but shall look solely to the
fund for compensation.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-08 (1985). Section 65-04-28 provides:
Employers who comply with the provisions of this chapter shall not be liable to respond in
damages at common law or by statute for injury to or death of any employee, wherever
occurring, during the period covered by the premiums paid into the fund.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-04-28 (1985). Section 65-05-06 provides:
The payment of compensation or other benefits by the bureau to an injured employee, or
to his dependents in case death has ensued, are in lieu of any and all claims for relief
whatsoever against the employer of the injured or deceased employee.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-06 (1985).
The sweeping language of North Dakota's exclusive-remedy provisions similarly limits an injured
worker's spouse or dependents in most cases from maintaining a cognizable claim in tort. See, e.g.,
Wald v. City of Grafton, 442 N.W.2d 910, 912 (N.D. 1989) (holding the exclusive-remedy provisions
precluded recovery by the spouse of an injured worker of damages for loss of consortium).
22. See generally,INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT BOARDS AND COMMISSIONS.
Exclusive Remedy Survey (1990) (setting forth a relatively comprehensive multi-jurisdictional
comparison of exclusive-remedy provisions of various statutory schemes). The rule of exclusivity is
broadly interpreted in order to effectuate the public policy underlying workers' compensation. Smith
v. Vestal, 494 N.W.2d 370, 375 (N.D. 1992); Barry v. Baker Elec. Co-op, Inc.. 354 N.W.2d 666, 673
(N.D. 1984).
23. Edward J. Higgins, So Much 'Quo" for So Little "Quid': Time for Michigan to Re-Examine
the Intentional Tort Exception to Workers' Compensation Exclusivity, 1992 DET. C.L. REv. 27, 34. As
one commentator so eloquently noted:
The theory underlying the workers' compensation acts never has been stated better
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rather than the individual worker to shoulder, in the first instance, the
burden of all costs associated with industrial production since:
[t]he industry or employment which requires human agency
for its operation should look to the care and upkeep of that
agency; and the [workers' compensation] acts have been said to
give merely recognition of the desirability of shifting the loss
of injury from the individual to the persons who benefited by
his engaging in the occupation in which he was injured. 24

Such costs can in turn be distributed to the consumers of a
particular product in the form of higher prices. 2 5 Disabled employees
and the families of those workers who die from work-related injuries
under the system can recover medical expenses and a portion of lost
wages at "fixed" amounts. 26 In cases in which the work-related injury
results in an employee's death, workers' compensation statutes additionally provide moderate funds to cover burial expenses and prescribe death
benefits to the workers' dependents. 27 The recovery attained in any
event, while guaranteed and relatively expedient, insures limited and
determinate liability for employers. 28 This limited liability makes
insurance against such losses possible since from a broad economic
point of view, the costs are relatively moderate and reasonably predict29

able.

In addition to cost distribution, staunch supporters of workers'
compensation laws vehemently proclaim that the prospect of an
employer's unilateral liability for every work-related injury' serves as

than in the old campaign slogan, "the cost of the product should bear the blood of the
workman." The human accident losses of modem industry are to be treated as a cost of
production, like the breakage of tools or machinery. The financial burden is lifted from
the shoulders of the employee, and placed upon the employer, who is expected to add it
to his costs, and so transfer it to the consumer. In this he is aided and controlled by a
system of compulsory liability insurance, which equalizes the burden over the entire
industry. Through such insurance both the master and the servant are protected at the
expense of the ultimate consumer.
KEEroN Er AL., supra note 1, at 573 (footnotes omitted). Accord Tepesch v. Johnson, 296 N.W. 740,
743 (Iowa 1941) (opining that the burdens and costs of employee injuries should be simply treated as
overhead and imposed upon the industrial enterprise).
24, 99 C.J.S. Worknen's Compensation § 5, at 41 (1958) (footnotes omitted). See generally
Breitwieser v. State, 62 N.W.2d 900, 902 (N.D. 1954) (noting that the object of workers' compensation
is to make the "industry" carry the burden of industrial injuries so that they are not borne by the
individual employee).
25. Higgins, supranote 23, at 34-35.
26. Id. at 35 & n.50.
27. See, e.g., N.D. CNT.CODE §§ 65-05-16 to -27 (1985 & Supp. 1993).
28. Kuhnert v. John Morrell & Co. Meat Packing, Inc., 5 F.3d 303,305 (8th Cir. 1993).
29. Higgins, supranote 23, at 35-36.
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strong incentive for the maintenance of workplace safety measures.3 0
The "true science" of workers' compensation has in fact been proclaimed
3
to be "accident" prevention. 1
Judicial and statutory exceptions to the exclusive-remedy provisions
of workers' compensation acts, however, are illustrative of a growing
dissatisfaction with the system as originally bargained. Due to the
perceived inequities that the cloak of immunity affords employers and
their agents for certain categories of conduct, much litigation centers on
testing the resolve of the exclusive-remedy provisions of the workers'
compensation acts. The challenge to exclusivity has been precipitated in
part due to the changes in the law which now represent improved
prospects for recovery under the modem tort system. 32 Consequently,
workers are, with increasing frequency, questioning the conditions under
which they ceded their common-law rights and are turning to the
judiciary with the hopes of supplementing or supplanting their statutory
benefits with recovery in tort.

30. Id. at 37. It has been said that "[n]ever before ... has the movement for accident prevention
and providing safety devices of every description in the factory, on the railroad, and in the mine. been
carried forward with such zeal." Id. at 37 n.57. "No system for compelling the installation of safety
devices and methods, enforceable by penal statutes or executive orders, could bring about the degree
of [safety], perfection and efficiency along that line which is attained today by many ... employers
operating under the [clompensation [Ilaw." Id. Contra Michael F. Marlow, Exclusive Remedy
Provisions in the Workers' Compensation System: Unwarranted Immunity for Employers' Wilful and
Wanton Misconduct. 31 S.D. L REv. 157 (1985). At least one commentator, however, has stated that
the goal of workplace safety has not been achieved by workers' compensation legislation:
It would be nice to think that employers are impelled by humane motives to consider the
health and safety of their employees as the paramount concern. But the unfortunate
truth is that business reacts best to hopes of profit maximization. Where some employers
can avoid more costly protections for their employees without incurring additional
liability, they usually will do so. Employers generally will act only if given the monetary
incentive to do so.
The employer faces little deterrence... especially as long as the marginal increase in
production out-distances the costs of the workers' compensation recovery. Actually, the
cost of the total workers' compensation recovery would be the upper limit to the
employer's cost under the present system. Most employers would pay only the increased
premiums that might result after the carrier pays the compensation.
Id. at 162 (footnotes omitted). The failure of the workers' compensation system to achieve workplace
safety has been one reason proffered by Congress for enacting OSHA legislation. Arthur J. Amchan.
'Callous Disregard"for Employee Safety: The Exclusivity of the Workers' Compensation Remedy
Against Employers. 34 LABOR L.J. 683, 686 (1983) (citing Congressman Phillip Burton. LEGISLATIVE
HSTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH AcT oF 1971, 91 st Cong., 2d Sess. 891 (1970)).
31. Paul Raymond Gurtler, Comment, The Workers' Compensation Principle: A Historical
Abstract of the Nature of Workers' Compensation, 9 HAMUNE J. PuB. L & POL'Y 285. 296 (1989).
32. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-02 (Supp. 1993) (abrogating the common-law doctrine
of contributory negligence and substituting the doctrine of comparative negligence in its place). New
or expanded bases of tort liability such as the advent of products liability and vicarious liability under
the doctrine of respondeat superior are representative examples of changes in the law which now
represent improved prospects for recovery.
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III. COMPENSABILITY OF ASSAULTS
The early general rule for intentional workplace assaults in many
jurisdictions was simple: No recovery! 33 . The rationale for the rigid rule
34
was that employees were hired to work, not to assault one another. It
was not viewed as fair to charge the damages resulting from such
35
lamentable conduct to an innocent and unsuspecting employer.
Moreover, courts could not view such assaults as traditional "compensable work accidents" due to the existence of a "personal flavor" to
them-such a peril could not reasonably be viewed as incidental to the
employment. 36
With the passage of time, injured workers began testing the resolve
and rationale of a rigid adherence to the rule of noncompensability for
work-related assaults. Even conservative courts began to eventually
recognize that certain maliciously assaulted employees should be
afforded relief under the compensation acts. 3 7 Ih order to ameliorate the
harsh effects of such a rule, a number of exceptions to the general rule
of noncompensability began to develop.
For example, an exception to the rule of noncompensability was
made under circumstances in which an employer knew of the violent or
drunken nature of an employee but still kept the worker on the job, and
a readily foreseeable assault upon a fellow employee occurred. 38 Courts

33. Horovitz, supra note 12, at 328. See, e.g., Pierce v. Boyer Van Kuran Lumber & Coal Co..
156 N.W. 509, 510 (Neb. 1916) (ruling that an injury by a worker to a fellow employee, whether in
anger or in play, is not a compensable injury arising out of the employment; compensation denied),
overruled by Socha v. Cudahy Packing Co., 181 N.W. 706.708 (Neb. 1921).
34. Horovitz. supra note 12. at 328.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 326-27. See Urak v. Morris & Co., 186 N.W. 345, 345-46 (Neb. 1922) (believing the
"dividing line" for accidental injuries to be a workplace assault; compensation denied); Mountain Ice
Co. v. McNeil, 103 A. 184. 185 (N.J. 1918) (holding that a claimant's injury sustained as a result from a
workplace dispute was not a risk within the reasonable contemplation of the employer; compensation
denied); Union Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 115 N.E. 676, 677 (Ind. Ct. App. 1917) (finding that an
injury resulting from a workplace assault which began as a quarrel regarding tools to do the work. was
not an injury which could be contemplated by a reasonable person to be a natural incident of the work;
compensation denied).
37. Horovitz. supra note 12, at 329-30.
38. Id. (citing In re Employer's Liability Assur. Corp., 102 N.E. 697. 698 (Mass. 1913) (finding
that the injury arose out of and in the course of employment and was therefore compensable. where
an obviously intoxicated employee, whose dangerous disposition was well known to the employer,
assaulted and killed a fellow employee)); Dodson v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 224 N.W. 289. 289-90
(Neb. 1929). The Dodson court stated:
Whenever an employer puts his employees at work with fellow servants who are known
to him to be incompetent, insane and dangerous, and injuries to such employees, while
engaged in their master's business, result therefrom, which may reasonably said to have
been induced by the peculiar conditions of the employment thus created and permitted by
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reasoned that the causal connection to the employment was clear even
though the specific injury was not the result of the particular work for
which the injured worker was hired. 39 Since a reasonable person could
very well anticipate the result, assaults under such circumstances were
40
viewed as incidental to the employment.
Similarly, another exception to the general rule of
noncompensability was made in a case in which a fatal attack was precipitated by an employee against a supervisor in retaliation for being
discharged from employment. 4 1 The risk of assault was found to be
intimately connected with the work since it was the supervisor's duty to
42
terminate employees.
Eventually, the number of exceptions began to multiply and
overwhelm the general rule in such a manner that the decisions among
the various fora were inconsistent and unpredictable. 43 The disarray that
existed in assault cases was analyzed and clarified in 1940 by Justice
Rutledge in the landmark decision of Hartford Accident & Indemnity
Co. v. Cardillo,44 a case in which he catalogued assault cases and
prescribed a solution which has since become the general rule with
respect to workplace assaults.
The claimant in Cardillo sustained a personal injury when, while
engaged in work that he was hired to perform, a supervisor maliciously
assaulted him after a name-calling exchange which was initiated by the

the master, such injuries so inflicted may properly be said to be not only received in the
course of employment, but also as arising out of said employment.
Id. at 289-90.
39. Horovitz, supra note 12. at 328 (citing McNicol's Case, 102 N.E. at 697)).
40. Id.
41. See Cranney's Case, 122 N.E. 266 (Mass. 1919). The foreman in Cranney's Case was shot
and killed by a worker who he discharged for insubordination. Id. The court, in holding that the injury
received arose out of and in the course of employment, was careful to note that the attack was
unprovoked and that the supervisor was not the aggressor. Id.
42. Id. The fact that the particular assault in this case took the form of a murder rather than a
broken bone was found to be immaterial since the risk of harm, irrespective of its result, was a natural
incident of the employment. Id. As such, compensation was awarded to the supervisor's family. See
In re Reithel, 109 N.E. 951 (Mass. 1915). In Reithel, the employer specifically directed the
supervisor, who was subsequently assaulted, to order a repeated trespasser from the premises. Id.
The court held that although a danger of being assaulted was not a usual concomitant of employment.
when a special duty arises which creates a corresponding special risk of personal violence, that duty
and risk become correlative. Id. at 952. The court in Reithel found that the risk could not be said to be
one which was not incidental to the employment. Id.
43. Assault cases in the realm of workers' compensation during this period were perhaps best
characterized as cases where "confusion and conflict ... reign." Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 649 (1940). See generally, Annotation,
Workmen's Compensation: Injury from Assault, 112 A.L.R. 1258 (1938); Annotation, Workmen's
Compensation: Injury from Assault, 72 A.L.R. 110 (1931)(discussing the early and diverse treatment
of assault cases).
44. 112 F.2d 11 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,310 U.S. 649 (1940).
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supervisor. 4 5 The plaintiff in this case was the insurance carrier that
appealed an order dismissing its complaint which sought to enjoin the
enforcement of a compensation award granted by the compensation
commission in favor of the claimant. The plaintiff contended that the
assault had no relation to the work, but rather was brought about by a
purely personal quarrel.46
The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis
by examining the rules and exceptions set forth in a number of assault
and horseplay cases, noting that the work itself often brings an employee
within a particular peril and makes the particular risk a part of the
employment for compensation purposes. 4 7 The court found a passage
from a decision by Justice Cardozo to be instrumental in framing its
analysis: "'The claimant was injured, not merely while he was in a
factory, but because he was in a factory, in touch with associations and
conditions inseparable from factory life."' 48 In examining the work
environment, the court cogently reasoned that:
associations include the faults and derelictions of human
beings as well as their virtues and obedience. Men do not
discard their personal qualities when they go to work. Into the
job they carry their intelligence, skill, habits of care and
rectitude. Just as inevitably they take along also their
tendencies to carelessness and camaraderie, as well as emotional
make-up. In bringing men together, work brings these
qualities together, causes frictions between them, creates
occasions for lapses into carelessness, and for fun-making and
emotion flare-up. Work could not go on if men became
automatons repressed in every natural expression. "Old Man
River" is a part of loading steamboats. These expressions of
human nature are incidents inseparable from working together.
They involve risks of injury and these risks are inherent in the
working environment. 49

45. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11. 13 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 310
U.S. 649 (1940).
46. Id. at 13.
47. Id. at 14.
48. id. (quoting Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 128 N.E 711 (N.Y. 1920)).
49. Id. at 15. Justice Rutledge opined that it was "[n]ot the particular or peculiar character of the
associations and conditions [that is pivotal], but that the work [itself] surrounds the employee with them
is the basic thing." Id. at 14.
It should be noted that there were a small number of early "state court" decisions which sustained
awards of compensation to the victims of assaults. See, e.g., Inland Steel Co. v. Flannery, 163 N.E.
841,841 (Ind. CL App. 1928). The court in Flannerynoted:
When coemployees are working together, it is expected that disagreements will arise in
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The court explained that the resistance to a broad rule which would
bring workplace assaults into the realm of compensable injuries was
based on a number of factors which were no longer critical to the
determination of compensability. 5 0 In further articulating its position,
the court adopted the view that:
rejects the test of immediate relevancy of the culminating
incident. That is regarded, not as an isolated event, but as part
and parcel of the working environment, whether related
directly to the job or to something which is a by-product of the
association. This view recognizes that work places men under
strains and fatigue from human and mechanical impacts,
creating frictions which explode in myriads of ways, only some
of which are immediately relevant to their tasks. Personal
animosities are created by working together on the assembly
line or in traffic. Others initiated outside the job are magnified
to the breaking point by its compelled contacts. No worker is
immune to these pressures and impacts upon temperament.
They accumulate and explode over incidents trivial and
important, personal and official. But the explosion point is
merely the culmination of the antecedent pressures. That is not
relevant to the immediate tasks, involves a lapse from duty, or
contains an element of volition or illegality does not disconnect
it from them nor nullify their causal effect in producing its
injurious consequences. Any other view would reintroduce the
conceptions of contributory fault, action in the line of duty,
nonaccidental character of voluntary conduct, and independent, intervening cause as applied in tort law, which it was the
purpose of the statute to discard. It would require the
application of different basic tests of liability for injuries
caused by volitional conduct of the claimant and those

connection with the work, and there may be blows and fighting. Injury to an employee
from such a source is one of the risks of the employment, and is an accidental injury
arising out of the employment, within the meaning of those terms as they are used in the
Compensation Act.
Flannery, 163 N.E at 841.
50. Cardillo, 112 F.2d at 15. One factor was premised upon the notion that quarrels and willful
assaults were always viewed as something personal and there was a fundamental opposition between
"personal" acts and "official" (work-related) acts. Id. This view was repudiated due to a recognition
that quarrels and fights could be caused by work. Id. Consequently, although workplace quarrels and
fights involve fault and volition, have no tendency to forward the employment, and are inundated with
the personal element of animosity and anger, this will not necessarily be sufficient to sever the causal
connection between the injury and the work. Id.
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resulting from negligent action, mechanical causes and the
51
volitional activities of others.
The court found the, entire sequence of events leading up to the
52
injury to be the normal and natural product of working together.
Consequently, the court affirmed the judgment awarding compensation. 53
It was the dictum of Justice Rutledge's opinion, however, which
marked the boundary for the rule of compensability for assault cases
when he expressed the view that "[tihe limitation, of course, is that the
accumulated pressures [of working together] must be attributable in
substantial part to the working environment. This implies that their
causal effect shall not be overpowered and nullified by influences
originating entirely outside the working relation and not substantially
magnified by it."54

51. Id. at 16-17 (footnotes omitted). Vestiges of the reasoning utilized by Justice Rutledge in
Cardillo can be found in cases as early as 1920. See, e.g., Verschleiser v. Stern & Son. 128 N.E. 126
(N.Y. 1920) (opining that workers' compensation was designed to ameliorate a social condition rather
than to fix liability by an adherence to common-law concepts).
Although critical to the court's analysis is the notion that tort concepts of fault, etc. have no
place in compensation determinations, the panel was unable to refrain from repeatedly noting that the
claimant was not the "aggressor" in the affray. See Cardillo, 112 F.2d at 13 & 18. The circuit court
also distinguished the case at hand from another case it had decided in which it denied compensation
on the grounds that the claimant in that case was the "aggressor." Id. at 18 (citing Fazio v. Cardillo,
109 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1940)). Such attention to this fact seems paradoxical regardless of the reasons
asserted in behalf of the aggressor defense in general. since the introduction of considerations of who
was the aggressor in a particular banter necessarily involves the element of fault. More interestingly,
the subsequent attitude of the District of Columbia since its landmark recitation in Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo was indeed to deny recovery to an aggressor. See Ackerman v. Cardillo,
140 F.2d 348, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1944). A number of courts have, however, utilized the Cardillodecision
as precedent for abrogating any distinctions between an innocent victim and an aggressor for
compensability purposes. See, e.g., Petro v. Martin Baking Co, 58 N.W.2d 731,735 (Minn. 1953).
52. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11, 17-18 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 310
U.S. 649 (1940). The Cardillo decision was indeed significant to the development of compensability
for workplace assaults. However, the idea that workplace injuries should be compensable since it is
the work environment which brings together in close proximity workers with differing ideas.
nationalities, and temperaments and a resulting injury is often a natural product of such associations
was not necessarily a novel notion in workers' compensation law. Cases regarding "horseplay" had
reached the same conclusion at least fifteen years earlier. See, e.g., Kansas City Fibre Box Co. v.
Connell, 5 F.2d 398,399-400 (8th Cir. 1925).
53. Cardillo, 112 F.2d at 17. The fact that the claimant may have been at fault for engaging in a
banter with his superior made him guilty of at most contributory fault. Id. at 18. Compensability
determinations under workers' compensation acts, however, do not hinge upon comparing fault. See
id.
54. Id. at 17. (emphasis added). This limitation is perhaps best typified in the "imported quarrel"
cases:
When the animosity or dispute that culminates in an assault is imported into the
employment from claimant's domestic or private life, and is not exacerbated by the
employment, the assault does not arise out of the employment under any test.
I LARSON. supra note 8, § I 1.20(a), at 3-274.
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The rule for the compensability of workplace assaults as promulgated in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Cardillo stemmed from
what some courts had previously characterized as an exception to the
general rule. However, the rule was clear:
The vital question must be: was the assault part and parcel of
the work or working environment, i.e., was it a work-induced
assault, in which case the injury due to the assault is compensable- or was the assault motivated by influences originating
entirely outside the working relation and not substantially
magnified by it; i.e., was it a purely personal matter, in which
case no right to a compensation award exists? 5 5
Mere inferences, without direct evidence, are generally sufficient to
establish that a particular quarrel which arose out of the employment was
not the result of a purely personal matter. 5 6 It should be noted, however,
that where the workplace happens to be merely the fortuitous site of an
assault which is otherwise purely personal in origin, compensation
benefits will be properly denied if the employment does not otherwise
impact the altercation. 57
Justice Rutledge's formulation has set the pattern for the current
legal theory of compensability for workplace assaults.58 Although early
courts originally characterized the majority of assaults to be wholly
personal in order to avoid compensability, the prevailing general rule
today is: if the assault can even in part be reasonably attributed to the
conditions or nature of the employment, courts will generally regard the
altercation to be a work-related assault, rather than a purely personal

55. Horovitz. supranote 12, at 331 (emphasis added).
56. Id. at 333.
57. Camegie v. Pan American Linen, 476 So. 2d 311,312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Tampa Maid
Seafood Products v. Porter, 415 So. 2d 883.884 n.2 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982). By the same token, it is
not necessarily a prerequisite that the assault take place on the premises of employment, as a
continuation of a quarrel which was initiated on the premises has been found to be compensable even
though the actual assault took place on the street or sidewalk. See Appleford v. Kimmel, 296 N.W.
861 (Mich. 1941).
58. Horovitz, supra note 12, at 331. See, e.g., Anderson v. Hotel Cataract, 17 N.W.2d 913,
916-17 (S.D. 1945) (utilizing the Cardillo decision as precedent for reversing the denial of an award
when an assault between co-employees stemmed from a quarrel about work abilities); Cunning v. City
of Hopkins, 103 N.W.2d 876, 882 (Minn. 1960) (citing Cardillo with approval and noting that the
decision "has found acceptance in liberalizing the application of compensation laws" in assault cases);
York v. City of Hazard, 191 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Ky. 1945). See also 1 LARsoN,supra note 8,§ 11.00, at
3-178 (stating that an assault is considered to arise out of the employment if either the reason for the
assault was an argument which had its origin in the employment or the risk of assault was increased
because of the setting or nature of the work; an assault arising from personal reasons do not arise out
of the employment unless the work was a contributing factor).
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matter. 59 Thus, compensability will be established and a claimant may
recover modest monetary relief from workers' compensation. By
contrast, the general rule for a purely personal assault is: when an
assault is not work-related but rather motivated solely by personal
animosity, arising from circumstances wholly unconnected with the
employment, the injury will not be compensable and monetary relief
from workers' compensation will be unavailable. 6 0 Of course, an
employer or co-employee will not be protected by the shield of
immunity conferred by the various compensation acts. A battered
worker, therefore, may freely pursue his or her common-law remedies
directly against the assailant and potentially receive full remuneration.
The critical inquiry in distinguishing a work-related assault from a
purely personal assault in most instances becomes whether the totality of
the circumstances demonstrate the presence of a sufficient nexus or
degree of job-relatedness between the employment and the injury. It is
not necessary that prior to the injury-producing event the employer or a
reasonable -person should have foreseen the assault. It is sufficient if
after the injury-producing event a reasonable person can see a
connection between the working environment and the resultant injury.
If the injury is foreseeable by a reasonable person under an objective
analysis, the assault arises out of the employment and the employee's
right to compensation is established. 6 1 Practically speaking, the burden
of establishing a sufficient nexus between the injury and the employ-

59. Horovitz, supra note 12, at 334-35. The origin of a particular dispute between two
protagonists is crucial when determining whether a given assault is "work-related." See Orozo v.
Texas Gen. Indem. Co.. 611 S.W.2d 724. 725 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (finding plaintiff's testimony to the
fact that he had no idea why his fellow employee attacked him to be insufficient to prove, as a matter
of law, that the attack was purely personal and not in any way related to his employment); Slusher v.
Fire Department, 280 N.W. 78 (Mich. 1938) (ruling that where there was no proof of any
disagreement over the work, the resulting unexplainable death which resulted in a shooting from a
supervisor was not compensable).
60. Some jurisdictions, including Minnesota, have created an "assault exception" to the threshold
requirement of compensability by directly including the rule of noncompensability for purely personal
assaults in the definition of compensable personal injuries. See. e.g., MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 176.011 subd.
16 (1993). The applicable statutory definition in Minnesota provides:
"Personal injury" means injury arising out of and in the course of employment...; but
does not cover an employee except while engaged in. on, or about the premises where
the employee's services require the employee's presence as a part of such service at the
time of the injury and during the hours of such service. Where the employer regularly
furnished transportation to employees to and from the place of employment such
employees are subject to this chapter while being so transported, but shall not include an
injury caused by the act of a third person or fellow employee intended to injure the
employee because of personal reasons, and not directed against the employee as an
employee, or because of the employment.
Id. (emphasis added). See Foley v. Honeywell, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 268 (Minn. 1992); Bear v.
Honeywell, Inc., 468 N.W.2d 546 (Minn. 1991) (applying the "assault exception").
61. Horovitz. supra note 12. at 234.
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ment in assault cases is generally not onerous since the line of demarcation between a "purely personal" assault and one whose roots are seeded
in the employment is at times not capable of being drawn with precision.
The difficulty in making such distinctions is owed in part to an
interweaving of the facts, the natural escalation that generally precedes
most affrays, the necessity of gauging the intent of the parties,
and judicial attempts to construe the facts in a manner which favors a
finding of coverage.
The vast majority of compensation acts, including North Dakota's,
contain the statutory requirement that the injury must arise by "accident"
in order to be compensable. 6 2 Indeed, the application and scope of most
compensations acts are usually measured by this threshold criterion.
The "accident" requirement was initially problematic for early courts
dealing with assault cases. The difficulty encountered arose because of
the compelling argument that injuries from an assault were the product
of intention as distinguished from accident which was mandated by the
various compensation acts. 63 This argument was quickly overcome "by
the simple expedient of viewing the affair from the point of view of the
victim rather than the assailant, since from the victim's point of view the
assault was an unexpected and untoward mishap." 64 The "accident"
component of workers' compensation is thus not construed in a strict or
technical sense under modem schemes but, rather, in a fashion which
effectuates the spirit and true intent of the legislation. Consequently, the
well-established and prevailing general rule is that an injury sustained by
an employee from an assault may be fairly regarded as an "accidental"
injury as the term is used in the coverage formulas of the various
compensation acts. 65 Stated differently, an unexpected assault may be

62. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(9) (Supp. 1993). Notwithstanding the absence of
specific statutory language in some jurisdictions, a number of courts nevertheless hold that only
injuries which result from an "accident" may be compensable under workers' compensation.
63. 2A LARSON, supra note 8. § 68.12, at 13-11. -12. Readinger v. Gottschall, 191 A.2d 694,
695-96 (Pa. 1963) (noting that there can be no recovery of benefits under workers' compensation
where the work-related injury is not the result of an "accident"); Shamp v. Landy Clark Co.. 277 N.W.
802 (Neb. 1938) (observing that there can be no recovery under the compensation scheme if any
essential element of an "accident" is lacking).
64. 2A LARSON, supra note 8, § 68.12, at 13-11. -12. See Stout v. North Dakota Workmen's
Compensation Bureau, 236 N.W.2d 889, 894 (N.D. 1975) (noting that an injury is "accidental" if the
result was not foreseen, anticipated, or intended by the injured person); Breimhorst v. Beckman, 35
N.W.2d 719.728-29 (Minn. 1949); Hagger v. Wortz Biscuit Co.. 196 S.W.2d 1,3-4 (Ark. 1946).
65. See, e.g., Jablonski v. Barry Multack & Max Lee Corp., 380 N.E.2d 924. 925-26 (II1.App. Ct.
1978) (ruling that the injuries sustained by an employee as a result of an unprovoked, work-related
assault by a fellow worker are compensable as accidental injuries within the meaning of that term as
used in compensation law); Gallimore v. Marilyn's Shoes, 233 S.E.2d 529, 531 (N.C. 1977) (ruling that
"[ain assault may be an accident within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act when it is
unexpected and without design on the part of the employee who suffers from it."); Heskett v. Fisher
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fairly regarded as an accident or accidental injury notwithstanding its
66
characterization as an intentional tort.
Currently, there are two categories of work-related assaults that have
posed difficulty for decisionmakers and on occasion have resulted in the
denial of compensation: (A) instances in which an assault resumes after
there has been a cooling-off period; and (B) instances in which the
claimant has been the aggressor in the assault. 67
A.

THE EFFECT OF A COOLING-OFF PERIOD

The existence of a cooling-off period between a workplace quarrel
and the act of personal violence creating the injuries has led a number of
courts to deny an award of compensation due to the view that an assault
arises out of the employment only if it transpires immediately. 68 If an
altercation or dispute is interrupted and then later resumed, some courts
have deemed the assault to have been transformed into private animosity
which has no connection to the work (become purely personal). 69 This
view has, on occasion, prevailed even though no independent basis for

Laundry & Cleaners Co.. Inc., 230 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Ark. 1950).
66. Daniels v. Swofford, 286 S.E.2d 582. 584 (N.C. 1982). "An injury may be the result of
accidental means though the act involving the accident was intentional." Lovely v. Cooper Indus.
Products, Inc., 429 N.E.2d 274. 277 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). "The circumstance that the injury was the
result of a willful or criminal assault by another does not exclude the possibility of injury by accident."
ARTHUR B. HoNNoLD. HoNNOLD ON WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION § 87 at 283 (1917).
67. 1 LARSON. supra note 8. § 11.12. at 3-225. The above-mentioned categories are generally
expressed as employer defenses to a compensability determination. Professor Larson identifies a third
category of assaults which on occasion has resulted in the denial of compensation: where the subject
matter of the quarrel which produced the assault was not technically within the scope of the claimant's
employment. Id. However, he concedes that such cases are quite old and are often criticized for
making hairsplitting distinctions about the employee's duties. Id. § 11.14, at 3-235. Moreover, it is
generally still possible to hold in a broader sense that such a quarrel arose out of the employment. id.
68. Id. § 11.13, at 3-225 (citing authority).
69. Id. at 3-225-26 (citing authority).

19941

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

923

private vengeance has subsequently intervened and nothing whatsoever
70
has occurred except for the lapse of time.
Professor Larson, however, criticizes a number of such cases which
deny compensation, opining that an assumption that the mere passage of
time converts a work-related dispute into one Which is purely personal is
generally not warranted. 7 1 The key inquiry in such cases, Larson asserts,
should be on what transpired during the cooling-off period, rather than
the mere length of the cooling-off period. 72 The length of the interval
should be immaterial if the only contacts between the protagonists in the
meantime were employment contacts. 73 Similarly, an assault should be
found to be compensable even when there is no contact between the
parties during the interval if the "purity of the [assault's] connection with
the employment remains undiluted by any possible unknown personal
element .... "74 Professor Larson intimates that compensation should be
denied only in situations when an unqualified departure from the
employment transpires (for example, "let's-step-outside" cases), or in
cases where some clear intervening element of a personal nature destroys
the link between the work origin of the altercation and the resulting
assault. 75 Moreover, the "cooling-off period" should at most be merely
an evidentiary consideration rather than relied on as a rule of law which
ipso facto severs the causal connection from the employment. 7 6

70. Id. See Martin v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 113 So. 578 (Ala. 1927) (noting that
although the original fight was connected with the employment, its subsequent renewal after a rest
period made it purely personal). See also Brown v. Industrial Comm'n, 82 N.E.2d 878 (Ohio 1948).
The altercation in Brown originated from a dispute over the kind of boxes being used in connection
with the particular task at hand. It was clear that the work being done at the time of the altercation
was being performed for the employer. Id. at 879. After grappling around on the floor for two
minutes, the claimant left the room after his adversary pulled a knife. Upon returning to the scene
approximately five minutes later, the claimant was hit over the head with a pipe. The court in Brown
denied compensation to the injured worker because in its view the five-minute interval terminated the
work-connected assault and transformed the subsequent blow into a purely personal altercation: 'It is
our conclusion that the cessation of hostilities broke the causal chain between the employment and the
injury at the time it was received." Id. at 880.
Professor Larson criticizes the decision in Brown and points out that it ignores humin
behavior in that an accosted worker within minutes after a heated argument, "is to be expected to
forget the whole matter and resume friendly relations with his antagonist-on penalty of being
adjudged guilty of carrying on a purely personal quarrel from that point forward. The expectation of
such saintly forbearance in ordinary men flies in the face of known facts." 1 LARSON, supra note 8, §
11.13 at 2-228.
71. 1 LARSON, supra note 8, § 11.12, at 3-228.
72. Id. at 3-229.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See generally I LARSON, supra note 8, § 11.14, at 3-232.
76. Ward v. Typhoon Air Conditioning, Co., 277 N.Y.S.2d 315, 317 (1967). See Hegler v.
Cannon Mills Co., 31 S.E.2d 918, 919 (N.C. 1944) (ruling that although the final assault transpired two
days after an argument stemming from two years of intermittent bickering and stemmed from anger or
revenge, it was 'still rooted in and grew out of the employment").
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THE "AGGRESSOR" DEFENSE

In its early development, the rule which permitted compensation in
assault cases allowed only innocent victims to recover. Courts, in dicta,
began to comment on and later create an exception for the assailant or
the "aggressor" in the assault. 77 The exception itself became a rule and
provided that there was no relief available under the compensation acts
for aggressors. The notion that "initiators" or "aggressors" could not
recover in assault cases stemmed from a "natural repugnance one has for
a guilty party" coupled with the firmly entrenched belief imported from
the common law of torts that such parties should not be allowed to
"profit by their own wrong." 78 The rationale seemed simple and logical.
No one should recover compensation for an affray he or she started.
The aforementioned reasoning was further buttressed by the prevailing
view that the aggressor in the affray had voluntarily and completely
abandoned the status as an employee and was akin to a criminal. 79 Such
an individual was deemed to be obstructing, rather than furthering the
business of the employer even when the precipitating cause of the
aggression could be attributable to the work. 80 This view was pervasive
in a number of jurisdictions even when the workers' compensation
statutes were silent with respect to aggressors.8 1

77. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Cardillo, 112 F.2d 11. 18 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
310 U.S. 649 (1940) (stating that the "[claimant may have been at fault, but he was the aggressor
neither in the banter nor in the physical encounter"). See also Pierce v. Boyer-Van Kuren Lumber &
Coal Co., 156 N.W. 509 (Neb. 1916) (ruling that no recovery was available for the aggressor in the
assault).
78. Horovitz, supra note 12. at 323. Wooley v. Minneapolis Equip. Co., 196 N.W. 477, 477
(Minn. 1923) (ruling that it would be rather a monstrous thing to hold that an employee may resort to
unlawful means to further the ends of his or her master and recover compensation if injured by reason
of the unlawful act of aggression). The "aggressor" defense was enacted in part to make the new rule
of compensability for workplace assaults more palatable. Horovitz, supra note 12. at 323. It provided
a "judicial bone of solace to the losing employer or insurer." Id. The "aggressor" defense further
provided the courts with a relatively quick and easy way to sustain an award in favor of an innocent
victim while at the same time not requiring an employer to assume liability for all injuries by assaults.
Id. at 323-24.
79. See Note. Workmen's Compensation-Assault of Fellow Employee -Recover)' by Aggressor,
38 MiNN. L. REV. 83, 84 (1953). Various rationales were propounded by courts in order to support the
interposition of the "aggressor" defense:
[Tihe employee starting an injurious affray was not performing any duty for, or
advancing any interest of, the employer and was not hired to incite trouble; rather, the
aggressive employee was acting for his own wrongful purposes and had voluntarily
abandoned his employer's work.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
80. Fischer v. Industrial Comm'n, 96 N.E.2d 478,482 (11. 1951).
81. See, e.g., Horvath v. La Fond, 8 N.W.2d 915, 917 (Mich. 1943) (ruling that the aggression
severed any causal connection with the employment and made the altercation purely personal despite
the absence of a specific statutory provision dealing with aggressors; compensation denied); Staten v.
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The majority of jurisdictions now generally reject the position that
initiating an assault by a claimant is by itself sufficient to remove the
82
ensuing injuries from the character of "arising out of the employment."
In a sizable minority of jurisdictions, however, the "aggressor" defense is
still in force either by statute or judicial proclamation. 8 3 The aggressor
defense is, however, becoming an antiquated canon of law and has been
characterized by Professor Larson to be one of the most rapid "doctrinal
reversals in the volatile history of compensation law." 8 4 One of the
rationales which has supported the abolition of the defense centers on
the view that the defense improperly relies too heavily on a fault-based
concept which has been borrowed from the law of torts and is argued to
have no place in the law of workers' compensation. 8 5 It creates a
fault-based defense in a no-fault system. As noted by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts in reversing the determination of the
Industrial Accident Board which denied compensation since the claimant
struck the first blow:
The striking of the first blow is not the sole and ultimate test as
to whether the injury arose out of the employment. We think it
is possible for an injury to arise out of the employment in the
broad sense of workmen's compensation law, even though the
injured employee struck the first blow. We must constantly
remind ourselves that in compensation cases fault is not a
determining factor, whether it be that of the employee alone or
that of the employee contributing with the fault of others ....
[Tihe question is whether the injury occurred in the line of
Long Turner Constr. Co., 185 S.W.2d 375, 381 (Mo. Ct. App. 1945) (finding the aggressive conduct to
be outside the course of employment; compensation denied).
82. 1 LARSON, supra note 8, § 11.15(a) at 3-235. See, e.g., Cunning v. City of Hopkins, 103
N.W.2d 876, 885 (Minn. 1960) (finding the question of who was the aggressor to be immaterial to the
compensation determination).
83. 1 LARSON, supra note 8, § 11.15(a) at 3-238 & 242-43. See Brady v. Clark Equip. Co., 249
N.W.2d 388, 389 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (noting that if a "plaintiffs injury occurred in the course of his
employment, the injury arose out of the employment as a matter of law, unless it can be shown that
plaintiff received his injury while perpetrating a malicious assault 'of such gross and reprehensible
nature as to constitute intentional and wilful misconduct" (quoting Crilly v. Ballou, 91 N.W.2d 493, 506
(Mich. 1958)).
84. 1 LARSON, supra note 8, § 11.15(c), at 3-244. North Dakota, however, continues to firmly
adhere to the "aggressor" defense. See N.D. CENT.CODE § 65-01-02(9)(b)(3) (Supp. 1993) (excluding
from the statutory definition of "compensable injury" "[ain injury that arises out of an altercation in
which the injured employee is the initial physical aggressor").
85. 1 LARSON, supra note 8, at 3-247. Analogizing to "horseplay" cases where the aggressor
defense has been argued in support of a denial of compensation, it was long ago said that:
The question as to who started the [fight] can become material only for the purpose of
fixing the fault, and ...fault of the injured employee... does not constitute a reason for
not allowing compensation .... [It] partakes of the nature of contributory negligence,
and assumption of the risk, of an action of a fellow-servant, neither of which have any
place in the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Stark v. State Indus. Acc. Comm'n, 204 P. 151, 157 (Or. 1922).
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consequences resulting from circumstances and conditions of
the employment, and not who was to blame for it .... So even
where the employee himself strikes the first blow, that fact does
not break the connection between the employment and the
injury, if it can be seen that the whole affair had its origin in
the nature and conditions of the employment, so that the
86
employment bore to it the relation of cause to effect.
Additionally problematic is the fact that it is generally quite
difficult, if not impossible, to draw clear lines and effectively determine
who was in fact the aggressor. Historically, incongruous decisions have
been the natural by-product of judicial attempts to affix a label to "the"
87
aggressor.
The issue of whether an award of compensation should be refused
to an aggressor in a work-related assault must be analyzed both from the
questions of whether the particular injury "arose out of" and occurred "in
the course of employment." "It is the character and nature of the assault"
which is the determinative issue for deciding whether a particular assault
arises out of the employment; who initiates the assault has no real
bearing on that query. 8 8 Questions of culpability and an aggressor
determination, however, do have relevance when considering whether the
culpability amounts to "an actual" or "willful intent to injure. "89
IV. MAINTAINING A COMMON-LAW TORT ACTION
Workers' compensation statutes are broadly interpreted in order to
aid the greatest possible number of workers. 9 0 Despite the focus of

86. Dillon's Case, 85 N.E.2d 69,71-72 (Mass. 1949) (citations omitted).
87. E.g., compare Kimbro v. Black & White Cab Co., 177 S.E. 274, 275 (Ga. Ct. App. 1934)
(finding the utterance of "strong language' to be the act of aggression even though the other worker
struck the first blow), with York v. City of Hazard, 191 S.W.2d 239, 241 (Ky. 1945) (opining that the
mere utterance of vile words is not tantamount to an act of aggression).
88. Horovitz, supranote 12, at 347.
89. See generallyN.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(b)(1) (Supp. 1993) (excluding from the definition
of "compensable injury' injuries caused by an employee's willful intent to injure another).
90. See Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 257 N.W.2d 679, 684 (Minn. 1977) (stating that workers'
compensation is broadly remedial; consequently, compensation laws should be construed to favor the
employee recovery of benefits in order to effectuate the act's purpose); Fischer v. Malleable Iron
Range Co., 225 N.W.2d 542, 545 (Minn. 1975) (holding that too narrow a construction of workers'
compensation statutes is to be avoided when the result is to exclude an employee from coverage):
Pleinis v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 472 N.W.2d 459, 462 (N.D. 1991)
(acknowledging that the Workers' Compensation Act should be liberally construed with the view of
extending its provisions to all who can fairly be brought within them); Balliet v. North Dakota
Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 297 N.W.2d 791, 794 (N.D. 1980) (recognizing that the workers'
compensation statutes should be liberally construed to avoid forfeiture and afford relief whenever
possible); Morel v. Thompson, 225 N.W.2d 584, 587 (N.D. 1975) (noting that where there is a question
as to whether an employer should be exempt from coverage, the doubt should be resolved in favor of
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workers' compensation on the accidental nature of a particular injury,
broad interpretations of compensation statutes have included serious
misconduct within their exclusive coverage. Accordingly, an increasing
number of employees are finding that instead of being helpful, the
statutes act as barriers which preclude the recovery of damages through a
civil action even when the injuries sustained have been intentionally
inflicted. The determinative issue is often whether a battered employee
can maintain a cause of action directly against the fellow employee or
employer who committed an intentional assault occurring at the
workplace.
Reported authority which satisfactorily addresses this issue appears
scant in a number of jurisdictions, including North Dakota, for a variety
of reasons. First, when a common-law suit is instituted and the defendant
asserts the exclusive-remedy provisions as an affirmative defense,
generally the issue is either summarily disposed of or proceeds at law
without workers' compensation being at issue. Second, due to the
"deep-pocket" theory, most actions are brought against the employers
vicariously rather than against a fellow servant whose actions actually
produced the worker's injuries, and are therefore largely ineffectual.
Third, as a practical matter, certain and swift recovery is often preferable
to a costly litigious battle. 9 ' This is especially the case in circumstances
in which the damage sustained, relatively speaking, is moderate. The
concomitant risk of workplace friction and fear of job loss is not a risk
that most are willing to readily undertake unless the potential benefit
outweighs any possible detriment. Furthermore, a tort action will only
make economic sense if the injured worker can expect to obtain a
recovery that substantially exceeds the benefits afforded by the workers'
compensation statutes.
A complete and satisfactory resolution of this issue would appear to
be a matter of first impression for a North Dakota court. For reasons set
forth more fully below, however, North Dakota practitioners and jurists
are not completely without guidance from North Dakota authority.

A.

RECEIVING COMPENSATION BENEFITS BARS ANY
COMMON-LAW RECOVERY

As previously intimated, once a workers' compensation act is
triggered and an employee having a compensable injury is deemed to be
within its ambit, any opportunity for an independent civil suit is
the injured worker).
91. An injured worker who may not be financially secure is more likely to accept workers'
compensation benefits and forego any otherwise maintainable tort claim because there would be no
real alternative. Barrino v. Radiator Specialty Co., 340 S.E.2d 295, 308 (N.C. 1986).
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generally cut off. Of course, the negative pregnant to this proposition is
that an employee whose injuries are not within the coverage formula of a
workers' compensation act whatsoever is not restricted to the rights and
remedies afforded therein. 92 The rule of exclusivity, under such
circumstances, is wholly inapplicable and an injured employee may seek
redress through the common law.
When ascertaining whether an employer or a fellow servant is
immune from civil suit due to the exclusivity provisions of the North
Dakota workers' compensation statutes, it must be recognized that the
inquiry is a question of law to be determined by the court. 9 3 An
employee cannot, by merely refraining from filing a claim, defeat the
limited immunity afforded an employer and fellow employees under the
exclusive-remedy provisions of the workers' compensation statutes. 94
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has in fact opined that an injured
worker who is covered by a workers' compensation act but who makes
no claim under it, generally has no other cause of action available. 9 5
The North Dakota Supreme Court has similarly ruled that under the
exclusive-remedy provisions of North Dakota's Workers' Compensation
Act, an injured employee "has no ability to elect whether or not to bring
suit against his or her employer [or co-worker]." 96 Consequently, when
determining whether the filing of a workers' compensation claim bars an
action at law, the operative issue should be one of "coverage" and not
"election". 97 If an injury is cognizable under the provisions of workers'
compensation, then any common-law remedy is usually barred.
Common-law principles generally should not be used to expand or
circumvent the statutory rights, remedies, and limitations of an injured
worker who falls within the coverage formula of the Act. 98

92. See Dunlavey v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 887 F.2d 893, 894 (8th Cir. 1989).
93. Westman v. Dessellier, 459 N.W.2d 545. 548 n.l (N.D. 1990). The plaintiff in Westman
argued that summary judgment was not proper under Rule 56 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil
Procedure since there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employer was entitled to
immunity under the exclusive-remedy provisions. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court, however.
affirmed the summary dismissal of the case and ruled that the question of an employer's immunity
under the North Dakota Workers' Compensation Act was "of course, a legal question, not a factual
one." Id.
94. See Olson v. American Oil Co., 474 F. Supp. 560, 562 (D.N.D. 1978); Hoerr v. Northfield
Foundry & Mach. Co., 376 N.W.2d 323,331 (N.D. 1985).
95. Smith v. Gould, Inc., 918 F.2d 1361, 1365 (8th Cir. 1990) (applying Nebraska law).
96. Hoerr v. Northfield Foundry & Mach. Co.. 376 N.W.2d 323, 331 (N.D. 1985) (emphasis
added).
97. Marlow v. Maple Manor Apartments, 228 N.W.2d 303.306 (Neb. 1975).
98. Effertz v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 481 N.W.2d 223, 225 (N.D. 1992).
See N.D. CENT.CODE § 1-01-06 (1987) (declaring that there is no common law where the law is set
forth in the North Dakota Century Code).
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It is generally agreed that once a party has participated in the fund
by successfully applying for and receiving workers' compensation
benefits, a civil lawsuit may no longer be maintained against an
employer or fellow employee. 99 This axiom is an integral component of
the rule of exclusivity in the majority of jurisdictions and is codified by
statute in North Dakota. 100 It holds true even when the worker's injuries
are intentionally inflicted or when the injuries sustained are not
completely compensable under the Act.101 The fact that an injured
employee mistakenly had the impression that the law afforded another
remedy does not change this result.102
A determination by the North Dakota Workers' Compensation
Bureau that an injury is covered by the Act operates as a final judgment
and, therefore, subsequently bars a party from collaterally attacking a
decision of the Bureau in another forum. It must be therefore
recognized that decisions of a compensation bureau, board, and
commission are on equal footing with decisions of a court of law.103 As
such, absent an appeal, a workers' compensation decision has res judicata
effect as to those matters which were adjudicable at the time of the

99. Westinan, 459 N.W.2d at 548; Gosnell v. Mullenix, 11 F.3d 780,781 (8th Cir. 1993); Gemand
v. Ost Servs., Inc., 298 N.W.2d 500. 503 (N.D. 1980). The acceptance of workers' compensation
benefits operates essentially as an estoppel to any claim of damages which might otherwise be
available. Behr v. Soth, 212 N.W. 461.464 (Minn. 1927). See Nyland v. Northern Packing Co.. 218
N.W. 869 (N.D. 1928) (ruling that when a worker injured in the course of employment elects to
proceed under the workers' compensation act, he or she is precluded from maintaining an action at
law against the employer); Schnoor v. Meinecke, 33 N.W.2d 66, 68 (N.D. 1948). See also Lovelette
v. Braun. 293 F. Supp. 41, 44 (D.N.D. 1968) (noting that even if a common-law cause of action were
otherwise maintainable, the tort action would be barred since benefits under the workers'
compensation act were applied for and received); Werner v. State, 424 N.E.2d 541, 544 (N.Y. 1981)
(opining that the receipt of compensation benefits resulted in a forfeit of the right to maintain an action
at law).
100. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-06 (1985). Section 65-05-06 provides: "The payment of
compensation or other benefits by the bureau to an injured employee, or to his dependents in case
death has ensued, are in lieu of any and all claims for relief whatsoever against the employer of the
injured or deceased employee." Id.
101. Hulne v. International Harvester Co., 496 F. Supp. 849. 853 (D.N.D. 1980); Schlenk v.
Aerial Contractors, Inc., 268 N.W.2d 466, 472-73 (N.D. 1978) (observing that even if an exception to
exclusivity existed in North Dakota for intentionally inflicted injuries, the receipt of compensation
constitutes an election of remedies which accordingly precludes a civil remedy). See Barrino v.
Radiator Specialty Co., 340 S.E.2d 295, 303 (N.C. 1986) (opining that even if the complaint alleged
intentionally inflicted injuries, a binding election of remedies was made when compensation benefits
were applied for and received).
102. Behr v. Soth, 212 N.W. 461,464 (Minn. 1927).
103. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-03 (Supp. 1993). Section 65-05-03 provides: "The bureau shall
have full power and authority to hear and determine all questions within its jurisdiction, and its
decisions, except as provided in chapter 65-10 [(Appeals)], are final and are entitled to the same faith
and credit as judgment of a court of record." Id.

930

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 70:4

decision. 104 It is likewise immaterial that workers' compensation may
have even been applied for and received after the commencement of a
civil suit directly against the alleged wrongdoer:
Since a workmen's compensation award was made, such
constitutes a finding that plaintiff's injuries arose out of and in
the course of employment and is binding and conclusive....
[E]ven after this action was begun and after Plaintiff was
examined before trial, he processed his Workmen's Compensation claim and accepted the award. Under such circumstances,
Plaintiff's right, in any event, to 'maintain a common-law action
for assault is lost and the jurisdiction of the Workmen's
Compensation Board becomes exclusive.1 05
Moreover, a party who receives benefits under workers' compensation may be effectively foreclosed from subsequently attacking the
constitutionality of the statutory scheme which afforded the remedy. 106
Based upon the foregoing, the general rule in North Dakota appears
to be well-established and clear: An injured employee or dependent who

104. Lass v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 415 N.W.2d 796. 800 (N.D. 1987).
See Westman v. Dessellier. 459 N.W.2d 545, 547 (N.D. 1990) (ruling that the trial court erred by not
giving res judicata effect to the determination of the Workers' Compensation Bureau). As noted by
Professor Larson:
The sequence in which the issue of res judicata is most frequently encountered is that of
a compensation claim followed by a common-law suit. If the conventional elements of
res judicata are present, a prior decision or finding on any relevant issue in a
compensation proceeding is res judicata as to the same issue in a subsequent suit at law to
recover for the same injury or death, whether the effect is to defeat the suit or to defeat
the defense to the suit.
2 LARsoN, supra note 8, § 79.72(d). It should be noted, however, that an adjudication that an injury is
not covered by workers' compensation is conclusive only of the fact that a workers' compensation
bureau, board, or commission lacks jurisdiction over the matter and does not bar an employee's
recourse to a remedy in tort. Marlow v. Maple Manor Apartments, 228 N.W.2d 303. 306 (Neb.
1975).
105. Stine v. Weiner, 238 N.W.2d 918, 923 (N.D. 1976) (quoting Moakler v. Blanco, 364
N.Y.S.2d 526, 527-28 (1975)). The plaintiff in Stine commenced a civil action in North Dakota for
injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Id. at 919. Although Stine and his supervisor lived and
generally worked in New York. they were supervising the installation of component parts for a missile
system that was being constructed by the federal government in North Dakota at the time of the
accident. Id. at 920. The fundamental issue in Stine was whether the plaintiff, after seeking and
receiving benefits under the New York Workers' Compensation Act as an employee injured in North
Dakota in the course of his employment may subsequently advance a common-law action in North
Dakota, Id. at 923. Finding the applicable New York workers' compensation provisions to be
substantially similar to those in North Dakota. the North Dakota Supreme Court gave full faith and
credit to the provisions and applied them in resolving the issue at hand. See id. at 921. The court
affirmed the summary dismissal of plaintiff's complaint asserting that the Stine himself actively pursued
a claim for compensation under New York law. Id. at 926. Accordingly, the exclusive-remedy
provisions barred any common-law action. id.
106. See Hulne v. International Harvester Co., 496 F. Supp. 849, 853 (D.N.D. 1980). See infra
note 182 and accompanying text.
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receives compensation or accepts other benefits from workers' compensation is exclusively relegated to that measure of recovery in lieu of any
and all rights of action against an employer or fellow servant that may
otherwise be available. 107 Injured employees, or their dependents, who
receive benefits under the compensation system have their fate sealed
regardless of the nature of their injuries.' 0 8 As stated by the North
Dakota Supreme Court, "[u]nder our law, once a claimant is allowed to
participate in the fund, he or she may no longer elect to bring a lawsuit
against the employer or a coworker."109

107. N.D. CETrr. CODE § 65-05-06 (1985). See supra note 103 for text.
108. It is significant to note that not all jurisdictions steadfastly !adhere to the rule that receiving
workers' compensation bars any otherwise maintainable action at law in all instances. Some
jurisdictions that have made exceptions to the rule of exclusivity for intentionally tortious conduct have
refused to find that the acceptance of benefits from the compensation system precludes an
intentionally injured worker from seeking common-law damages for the same injury. See, e.g., Jones
v. VIP Devel. Co., 472 N.E.2d 1046. 1054 (Ohio 1984); Le Pochat v. Pendleton, 63 N.Y.S.2d 313.
314-16 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1946). It has been reasoned by at least one court that:
ITihe protection afforded by the Act has always been for negligent acts and not for
intentional tortious conduct." To limit a worker injured by the employer's intentional
misconduct to workers' compensation benefits would actually encourage such conduct.
To bar an intentionally injured worker from the courtroom because he has received such
benefits would have the same effect. An employer in such a case could merely refrain
from contesting the claim, thereby facilitating the receipt of limited compensation, and
then reap the rewards of absolute immunity from further liability. This court will not
foster such practices.
Nor does the determination of the Industrial Commission that the injury arose out of
employment constitute res judicata. barring the claimant from litigating the issue of
intentional conduct. Resjudicata and collateral estoppel do not apply unless there is an
identity of parties and issues. The requisite identity of issues is absent here. The question
of intentional infliction of injury is not an issue before the Industrial Commission in
awarding workers' compensation benefits. The conclusion of the commission that the
injury arose out of the employment will not estop the claimant from pursing his
common-law remedies for intentional tort.
Jones, 472 N.E.2d at 1054-55 (citations omitted). In order for an injury to fall within the coverage
formula of the North Dakota Workers' Compensation Act, it must be determined that the injury was by
"accident." Any subsequent action at law on the theory that the very same injury was "intentional"
would not likely succeed in North Dakota. See generally Morris v. Ford Motor Co., 31 N.W.2d 89, 90
(Mich. 1948) (ruling that a worker who adopted one theory in order to establish his right to
compensation, "may not thereafter bring other proceedings based upon an inconsistent, opposite
theory or claim").
109. Westman v. Dessellier, 459 N.W.2d 545. 548 (N.D. 1990) (citations omitted). As set forth
earlier, the general rule is that an employee who has an injury that falls within the coverage formula
of the North Dakota Workers' Compensation Act has no right to an "election" of remedies, but is
relegated solely to those remedies afforded by the Act. As can be gleaned from the above quoted
passage, however, North Dakota authority does not appear altogether consistent on this point. See,
e.g., Schlenk v. Aerial Contractors. Inc., 268 N.W.2d 466, 472 (N.D. 1978) (noting that an injured
employee's election to pursue a workers' compensation remedy precludes a later common-law action
for intentional injuries); Breitwieser v. State, 62 N.W.2d 900, 903 (N.D. 1954) (opining that when the
claimant "made her application for compensation under North Dakota workmen's compensation law
she elected to come under that law").
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SEARCHING FOR AN EXCEPrION TO ExCLUSIVITY

The exclusive-remedy rule determines under what circumstances, if
any, an injured worker's remedy against his or her employer or fellow
employees is limited to workers' compensation and when, if at all, that
worker may proceed against such individuals under other theories of
recovery such as common-law tort. An employee seeking to avoid the
broad immunity granted by the exclusive-remedy rule must generally
find an exception to exclusivity in order to avail him or herself of a
common-law remedy.
1. Noncomplying Employer Exception
The shield of immunity from common-law liability that an
employer and its agents maintain arises by virtue of the fact that the
employer contributes financially to the compensation fund through
premiums.1 10 Absent such contribution, no immunity exists and the rule
of exclusivity is inapplicable even in actions for ordinary negligence.Il
Recovery under the common law is completely open to an injured
employee when an employer who is subject to the Act has failed to
comply with its terms as required by North Dakota law. Moreover, a
noncomplying employer in North Dakota is by statute precluded from
affirmatively interposing the traditional common-law defenses of the
fellow-servant rule, assumption of risk, or contributory negligence."12
2.

Third-Party Exception:
The Cumulative-Remedy Provision

Workers' compensation is intended to govern only the rights
between employers and employees."l 3 As such, the exclusive-remedy
provisions are intended to be a bar only to actions against an employer
or fellow servant by an employee, or actions which are derivative from
the employee's claim. An employee's right of action at law against a
third party who either caused or contributed to an injury is expressly

I10.

Blumhardt v. Hartung, 283 N.W.2d 229. 233 (S.D. 1979).
111. Id.; Moen v. Melin. 231 N.W. 283. 285 (N.D. 1930) (ruling that an employee who sues his
uninsured employer is entitled by law to have the damages sustained measured by the rules applicable
to common-law actions). See Olson v. Hemsley, 187 N.W. 147, 149 (N.D. 1922) (holding that either a
personal representative or a dependent of a deceased employee can maintain a cognizable claim at
law against a noncomplying employer).
112. N.D. CENr. CODE § 65-09-01 (1985).
113. Guillard v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works. 488 F.2d 20.23 (8th Cir. 1973).
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preserved by most compensation acts, including North Dakota's. 114
Thus, the workers' compensation acts generally do not shield third-party
tortfeasors from liability for damages in tort, even if the cause of action
is based on ordinary negligence. The rationale underlying the allowance
of third-party actions is the moral notion that the ultimate loss ensuing
from one's wrongdoing should, as a general proposition, be borne by the
actual wrongdoer whenever possible."1 5 Moreover, it is universally
agreed that the compensation system was not formulated to extend the
shield of immunity to strangers to the employment relationship." 16
The statutory provision which specifically preserves third-party
actions in North Dakota despite the fact that the injuries sustained may
come within the "coverage formula" of the Act, is set forth at section
65-01-09 of the North Dakota Century Code and is commonly referred
to as the "cumulative-remedy provision." The measure provides in
pertinent part that:
When an injury or death for which compensation is payable
under provisions of [the Workers' Compensation Act] shall
have been sustained under circumstances creating in some
person other than the fund a legal liability to pay damages in
respect thereto, the injured employee, or the employee's
dependents may claim compensation under this title and
proceed at law to recover damages against such other person.
The fund is subrogated to the rights of the injured employee or
the employee's dependents to the extent of fifty percent of the
damages recovered up to a maximum of the total amount it has
paid or would otherwise pay in the future in compensation and
benefits for the injured employee.117
As can be readily discerned from the foregoing statutory provision,
an employee's remedy for work-related injuries under North Dakota law
against a third-party tortfeasor is cumulative rather than alternative. An
injured worker is not forced to an election of remedies when a "third
party" has caused or contributed to the injury. An injured employee
may recover full benefits under workers' compensation and still
commence an action at law against a third-party tortfeasor for the

114. See. e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-09 (Supp. 1993). An injured employee's right of action
against third parties is not imparted to an employee by the workers' compensation acts, but is a
previously existent common-law right that is preserved by the acts. Rehn v. Bingaman, 36 N.W.2d
856, 859 (Neb. 1949).
115. 2 LARSON, supra note 8, § 71 at 14-1.
116. See id.
117. N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-09 (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
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recovery of damages."l 8 The fact that a particular plaintiff has applied
for and received workers' compensation benefits for the same injury has
absolutely no bearing on his or her right to recover for injuries against a
third-party tortfeasor, and evidence tending to demonstrate that fact is
generally held to be inadmissible. 1 9 The North Dakota Supreme Court
has observed that the cumulative-remedy provision was clearly designed
as "incentive for the worker to pursue and litigate legal claims against
culpable third parties."1 20
An employee who recovers compensation benefits is, of course, not
permitted to retain the entire amount of both the benefits under workers'
compensation and the damages recovered under the common law against
a third party. To permit otherwise would allow an employee to attain an
undeserved windfall essentially at the employer's expense. Consequently, both under the express statutory language of the cumulative-remedy
provision and by continuing construction of the courts, an employer or
compensation insurer who has paid workers' compensation benefits to an
employee injured or killed by a third-party tortfeasor is "subrogated"
pro tanto to the "rights" of the employee or the employee's dependents.12' Up to one-half of any amount ultimately recovered against a
third party must be reduced by, or offset against, the amount of benefits
paid or payable to an injured employee.1 22 Should an injured worker

118. Id.
119. Guile v. Greenberg, 257 N.W. 649 (Minn. 1934). The introduction of evidence to a jury
that demonstrates the plaintiff received or is entitled to workers' compensation benefits has been held
to constitute prejudicial error necessitating a new trial or a reversal. See, e.g., Altenbaumer v. Lion
Oil Co., 186 F.2d 35,35-36 (5th Cir. 1950), cert. denied,341 U.S. 914 (1951).
120. Lawson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 409 N.W.2d 344, 347 (N.D.
1987).
121. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-09 (Supp. 1993). See also Ness v. North Dakota Workmen's
Compensation Bureau, 313 N.W.2d 781, 782 (N.D. 1981) (noting that if an injured employee recovers
damages from a third party, specifically described subrogation rights attach); Breitwieser v. State, 62
N.W.2d 900. 903 (N.D. 1954). The North Dakota Supreme Court has noted that the term
'subrogation' is not defined in the workers' compensation law or elsewhere in the North Dakota
Century Code, but has defined the term as: '"a legal operation by which a third person who pays a
creditor succeeds to his rights against the debtor as if he were his assignee." Ness v. North Dakota
Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 313 N.W.2d 781, 782 (N.D. 1981) (quoting WEasTER's THIRD NEW
.INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY).

An argument that the subrogation interest of the North Dakota Workers' Compensation
Bureau should be proportionately reduced by the percentage of fault attributable to the injured
employee in a suit against a third party has been rejected by the North Dakota Supreme Court. See
Kelsh v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 388 N.W.2d 870, 871 (N.D. 1986).
122. Breitwieser v. State, 62 N.W.2d 900, 903 (N.D. 1954). The North Dakota Supreme Court
has opined that:
The purpose of [a] provision for subrogation is to make the wrongdoer who caused the
injury, contribute to the payment of compensation for that injury to employee or his
dependents whenever possible. This subrogation is a part of the rights yielded by the
employee for the right of speedy compensation without regard to his own fault. The
injured employee or his dependents receive compensation allowed by law irrespective of
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choose not sue a third-party tortfeasor for the injuries sustained, the
insurer, compensation bureau, or employer is generally entitled to
"indemnity" against a "third party" and may sue in the place of the
employee to obtain reimbursement. 123 The purpose of indemnity and
subrogation rights under the compensation scheme, therefore, is to
reimburse the fund at the expense of the "third party" whose fault made
the payment of workers' compensation benefits necessary.1 24 However, it
should be noted that the exclusive-remedy provisions of North Dakota's
Workers' Compensation statutes insulate the employer whose negligence
has played a part in the employee's harm from contribution to a
tortfeasor in a third-party action in the absence of an express agreement
to the contrary.1 25
The question of who is a "third party," and accordingly subject to a
separate action for common-law damages by virtue of the cumulative-remedy provisions of the various compensation acts, frequently arises.
The class of persons amenable to third-party actions generally does not
include the "employer," or others who may be so treated, in most
instances. 12 6 Similarly, a "co-employee" acting in the course of
employment is either by statute or judicial decision excluded from the
category of a "third party" in the majority of jurisdictions. 2 7 The
the result of the lawsuit. If recovery is made that reimburses the fund for the
compensation allowed the employee or his dependent. Anything recovered above that is
retained by the employee or his dependent.
Id.
It is significant to note that the North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau is required to pay
fifty percent of the concomitant litigation costs associated with prosecuting an action against a
third-party tortfeasor. Lawson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau. 409 N.W.2d 344,
347 (N.D. 1987).
123. Ness v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 313 N.W.2d 781,782 (N.D. 1981).
124. Blaskowski v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 380 N.W.2d 333, 335 (N.D.
1986).
125. Stuhlmiller v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 475 N.W.2d 136, 139 (N.D. 1991) (ruling that "although
the workers [sic] compensation statutes ordinarily prohibit a third-party tortfeasor from obtaining
contribution from the employer, there is an exception when the employer has entered into an express
contract to indemnify the third-party tortfeasor"); Barsness v. General Diesel & Equip. Co., 422
N.W.2d 819, 822 (N.D. 1988) (opining that the exclusive remedy provisions of North Dakota's
Workers' Compensation Act effectively preclude a third-party tortfeasor from obtaining contribution
from an employer, irrespective of the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act set forth in the North Dakota
Century Code); Sayler v. J.D. Holstrom, 239 N.W.2d 276, 279 (N.D. 1976).
126. "If an employer ... has a second legal persona creating completely independent duties, a
few jurisdictions have held that he may be sued as a third person for violation of those duties." 2A
LARSON, supra note 8, § 72 at 14-84. This theory of liability is often expressed as the "dual capacity"
doctrine and operates as an exception to the rule of exclusivity. North Dakota has expressly refused
to adopt this exception. See Latendresse v. Preskey, 290 N.W.2d 267, 271 (N.D. 1980). Schlenk v.
Aerial Contractors, Inc., 268 N.W.2d 466, 474 (N.D. 1978) (opining that "[tihe North Dakota
Workmen's Compensation Act does not permit the application of the dual capacity theory").
127. See 2A LARSON, supra note 8, § 72.21 at 14-119. But see LITTLE ET AL., supra note 8, at 450
(noting that "[i]n the absence of a special provision in the compensation statute, coworkers are
generally considered third parties subject to suit by an injured employee"). See generally Annotation,
Right to Maintain Direct Action Against Fellow Employee for Injury or Death Covered by Workmen's
Compensation. 21 A.L.R.3d 845 (1968).
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rationale for excluding an "employer" and "co-employee" from the
reach of the various statutes which preserve third-party actions inures
from the immunity afforded an employer and extended to his or her
agents by virtue of the exclusive-remedy provisions. 128 The legislative
extension of immunity to a "co-employee," and the concomitant
rationale for excluding a "co-employee" from the category of a "third
party," is a necessary and consistent corollary to the fundamental
underpinnings of the "compensation principle":
The reason for the employer's immunity is the quid pro quo by
which the employer gives up his normal defenses and assumes
automatic liability, while the employee gives up his right to
common-law verdicts. This reasoning can be extended to the
tortfeasor coemployee; he, too, is involved in this compromise
of rights . . .. [O]ne of the things he is entitled to expect in
return for what he has given up is freedom from common-law
suits based on industrial accidents in which he is at fault.129
Moreover, in view of the fact that the bureau, employer, or
compensation insurer is universally afforded a right of subrogation or
indemnity against culpable "third parties," imposing traditional tort
liability upon a "co-employee" as such a "third party" would seem
inimical to the goals of the compensation scheme. The practical result
may in essence relieve the employer of the cost of compensation and
shift the financial responsibility for work-related injuries from the
industry onto the shoulders of workers by virtue of their status as
"co-employees."
Although a small minority of jurisdictions has regarded a
"co-employee" as a "third party" amenable to civil suit, it is generally the
specific terms of the statutes which govern that result.130

128. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-08 (1985) (extending an employer's immunity from
common-law suit to "any agent, servant, or other employee'). It is, however, worth noting that the
three other statutory provisions which are integral to the rule of exclusivity in North Dakota are
completely silent with respect to co-employees, agents, and servants. See supra note 32.
129. 2A LARSON, supra note 8,§ 72.21 at 14-119 to -152. It has been further argued that:
[llf
co-employees were routinely subject to negligence claims by other co-employees,.
employer would be pressured to provide them with liability insurance. Accordingly, the
costs of subjecting co-employees to tort liability might well ultimately end up being bome.
by employers, not by way of vicarious liability, but by their employees' liability. This
could indirectly subvert the employer's immunity.
Joseph H. King, Jr.. The Exclusiveness of an Employee's Workers' Compensation Remedy Against His
Employer, 55 TENN. L. REv. 405 (1988).
130. See, e.g., Blumhardt v. Hartung, 283 N.W.2d 229, 231 (S.D. 1979); Vittum v. New
Hampshire Ins. Co.. 369 A.2d 184, 187 (N.H. 1977); Garcheck v. Gorton. 226 N.W.2d 432, 434 (Wis.
1975) (noting that a common-law action may be maintained by a worker against a co-employee as a
'third party'); Rehn v. Bingaman, 36 N.W.2d 856, 859-60 (Neb. 1949); Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d
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An interpretation of the cumulative-remedy provision of the North
Dakota Workers' Compensation Act, when construed in tandem with the
exclusive-remedy provisions and the interpretation thereof by the North
Dakota Supreme Court, seems to lead to the conclusion that a third-party
action against a "co-employee" acting in the scope of employment is
foreclosed in North Dakota. 13 1 Such a view preserves third-party actions
against only "true strangers" to the employment relation and is more
consonant with the immunity afforded co-employees for their negligent
conduct in most jurisdictions by the tacitly bargained-for quid pro quo.
"Intentional-Injury" Exception?
Injured Employees: 0
Employers & Co-Employees: 3
Injured employees have on at least three occasions attempted to
avoid the "exclusive" coverage of the North Dakota Workers' Compensation Act by arguing that an exception to exclusivity exists for injuries
which are intentionally inflicted. The battle over exclusivity on this front
has on all three occasions resulted in a victory for the employer and
3.

1323. 1327 (Alaska 1977) ("When an employer or fellow employee commits an intentional tort, he can
be considered to be outside the purview of the statute and can be treated as a third person."). One
court has noted that a previously existing common-law right of action against a "co-employee" is
preserved under the workers' compensation scheme:
[Ilt is generally the rule that a fellow employee would also be [a third party] regardless
of the capacity of his employment, so long as he did not occupy the relationship of
employer of plaintiff.
"When the term 'third party' is mentioned in the Workmen's Compensation Act, it
means any person other than the master, or those whom the act makes master, the
employee who is seeking compensation under their agreement. The act is careful to
preserve the status of a third person by not defining the term: so the presumption must be
that the law as to third persons in every respect stands as it was before the act." To hold
otherwise would unjustly confer upon every employee freedom to neglect his duty
toward a fellow employee and thus escape with impunity from all liability for damages
proximately caused by his own negligence.
Rehn, 36 N.W.2d at 859-60 (citations omitted). In these jurisdictions, the fact that the accident may be
covered by workers' compensation law does not necessarily bar a separate tort action against a
co-employee as a third party.
A number of jurisdictions have by statute created an exception to exclusivity which permits
common-law actions to be maintained against co-employees for certain categories of misconduct.
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 176.061 subd. 5(c) (Supp. 1993) (setting forth under the cumulative
remedy-provision of third party liability: "A coemployee working for the same employer is not liable
for a personal injury incurred by another unless the injury resulted from the gross negligence of the
coemployee or was intentionally inflicted by the coemployee.").
131* See generally Stuhlmiller v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 475 N.W.2d 136, 138 (N.D. 1991) (ruling
that a co-employee is statutorily immune from a common-law action); Stine v. Weiner, 238 N.W.2d
918, 925 (N.D. 1976) (holding that the "sole remedy" of a worker who sustained a work-related injury
due to the negligence of a co-employee is workers' compensation); Boettner v. Twin City Constr. Co..
214 N.W.2d 635 (N.D. 1974) (opining that the statutes granting immunity from suit are applicable to
the employer and fellow employees of the employee who is injured); Lacy v. Grinsteinner, 190
N.W.2d 1I,16 (N.D. 1971) (noting that an employee injured by the negligent act of co-employee has
no right of action against that co-employee).
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co-employees, with the shield of immunity being at most only dented
rather than pierced. 132,

a.

Schlenk v. Aerial Contractors,Inc.,
268 N.W.2d 466 (N.D.1978)
In Schlenk v. Aerial Contractors,Inc. 133 an injured employee who
had availed himself of the compensation system by applying for and
accepting workers' compensation benefits, brought suit against his
employer and fellow employees alleging that he was willfully and
intentionally injured because the defendants were aware of a particular
34
hazard and did nothing to alleviate the danger.1
Schlenk was employed as a telephone lineman by Aerial Contractors. He became seriously injured while using a piece of equipment
furnished by the company which was allegedly hazardous to operate.
Schlenk asserted that the defendants' conduct was the cause of his
injuries and constituted a "deliberate, intentional, and willful" act, and
thereby fell outside the scope of the North Dakota Workers' Compensation Act. 13 5 The defendants argued that even if their conduct could be
fairly characterized as intentional or willful, the statutory provisions of
the North Dakota Workers' Compensation Act did not contain an
exception for intentional or willful injuries inflicted upon an employee
36
by an employer or fellow employees.1
The North Dakota Supreme Court, applying a former version of the
Act, affirmed the summary dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint.13 7 .
Chief Justice Erickstad, writing on behalf of a unanimous court, agreed
with the defendants that no language of the Act provided an exception
for intentional or willful injuries when inflicted upon a worker by an
employer or fellow worker when the injuries were sustained in the course
of employment.13 8 The unified court in Schlenk opined, however, that
"public policy" could very well require the finding of an "exception" to
the exclusive-remedy provisions of the North Dakota workers' compensation statutes "where the circumstances involve an actual intent to

132. It is significant to note that in each challenge to exclusivity, the injured worker or his
dependents applied for and received benefits from workers' compensation and that each case resulted
in the affirmance of a motion for summary judgment.
133. 268 N.W.2d 466 (N.D. 1978).
134. Schlenk v. Aerial Contractors, Inc., 268 N.W.2d 466.468 (N.D. 1978).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 468-69.
137. Id. at 474.
138. Schlenk v. Aerial Contractors, Inc., 268 N.W.2d 466,471 (N.D. 1978).
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injure, such as in the case of an intentional assault and battery, or where
the negligence is so gross as to be equivalent to an actual intent to
injure."139 The North Dakota Supreme Court quickly disposed of the
matter at hand by finding that the facts of the case did not come within
"either" of those possible public-policy "exceptions" to exclusivity.' 4 0
Consequently, the court held "that an actual intent to injure would be
necessary to rob the injury of the accidental character and thus have the
injury fall within the exception for intentional or willful injuries."141 The
court concluded that the conduct attributed to the defendants in the case
was "accidental" rather than "intentional" in character and, thus, would be
encompassed by the North Dakota Workers' Compensation Act. 142 Since
Schlenk's injuries were covered by the Act, the court was of the view that
he was relegated solely to that measure of recovery. As such, the North
Dakota Supreme Court ruled. that Schlenk's right to institute a common-law action against his employer and co-employees for the injuries
he sustained was effectively barred by the exclusive-remedy provisions. 143
The North Dakota Supreme Court in Schlenk carefully avoided
resolving whether an exception to exclusivity actually existed under
North Dakota law for intentionally inflicted injuries. However, the court,
although in dicta, for the first time recognized the possibility of an
employee's right to pursue a common-law action against an employer or
fellow employee in certain circumstances, and thereby avoid the rule of
exclusivity for those injured in work-related accidents. As previously set
forth, the court opined that "public policy" could require an exception to
exclusivity in cases in which there existed an "actual intent to injure."
One of the most significant aspects of the Schlenk opinion can be
found in the court's recitation of the ostensibly alternative standards
available for satisfying the "actual intent to injure" requirement and the
possible exception to exclusivity. The court expressed the seemingly
unmistakable sentiment that the "actual intent to injure" requirement
could be satisfied by adequately demonstrating that either: 1.) the
circumstances involved "an actual intent to injure" "or" 2.) the "negligence was so gross" as to be tantamount to an actual intent to injure.'4

139. Id. (emphasis added).
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 472.
142. Id. at 471 & 472 (emphasis added).
143. Schlenk, 268 N.W.2d at 472.
144. Id. at 471 (emphasis added). When read in isolation, the North Dakota Supreme Court's use
of the phrase "negligence was so gross" seems to be an inartful articulation of and even inconsistent
with the actual intent to injure standard the court set forth in dicta. However, a reading of this phrase
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In doing so, the Schlenk court unanimously acknowledged two
"potential" fronts of attack on the shield of immunity for workers who
were willfully or intentionally injured. The North Dakota Supreme
Court, however, failed to fully clarify its position with respect to the issue
of what injurious conduct of an employer or co-employee could fairly
be considered sufficiently "intentional" to allow an injured worker to
pursue a common-law tort action in avoidance of the rule of exclusivity.
More problematic was the fact that the court did not delineate any
standards or provide any meaningful guidance for determining when the
"negligence was so gross as to be equivalent to an actual intent to
injure."1 4 5
. Attempting to examine the level of intent required to fulfill the
alternative avenues of the "actual intent to injure" standard as the Schlenk
court posited in dicta is fraught with difficulty and somewhat speculative
in the absence of a more complete articulation from the court. A fair
reading of the opinion can, however, readily lead to the conclusion that a
deliberate act of an employer or co-employee which evinces a subjective,
conscious, and specific intent to bring about an injury will satisfy the
standard. Similarly, it seemed quite evident from the court's analysis that
merely "gross negligence" was insufficient to fulfill the "actual intent to
injure" standard and surmount the exclusiveness bar. Equally apparent
from the opinion language and the natural inferences to be drawn
therefrom is that the court was of the view that some level of culpability

in conjunction with the opinion as a whole and the phrase "as to be equivalent to an actual intent to
injure" which immediately follows, leads one to conclude that the court meant something different from
and more than mere gross or culpable negligence. When read as a whole, the phrase "negligence was
gross as to be the equivalent to an actual intent to injure." imports a sense of deliberateness and not
mere inadvertence or lack of judgment. It seems to connote conduct to which moral blame attaches.
145. See id.
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or tortious conduct which is less than a deliberate intent to injure could
penetrate the shield of immunity. 146 To give the express language of the
opinion in Schlenk any other construction would, in essence, ignore the
plain distinction the court drew in setting forth alternative standards and
render that part of the decision mere surplusage.

146. A plausible interpretation of what level of culpability or conduct on the continuum from
gross negligence to a specific intent to injure that would satisfy the degree of intent characterized by
the court in Schlenk to be the functional "equivalent to an actual intent to injure" can be made.
Virtually every jurisdiction in the United States has either by statute or judicial construction recognized
an intentional tort exception to exclusivity. Alternative standards or tests have been utilized in order to
determine whether an employer's or co-employee's conduct was "intentional" for the purposes of the
particular exception-the "true intentional tort" test and the "substantial certainty" test. See
Beauchamp v. Dow Chem. Co., 398 N.W.2d 882. 891 (Mich. 1986); Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 472
N.E.2d 1046, 1050 (Ohio 1984) (holding that conduct that lacks a specific intent to injure can be
properly deemed to be intentional for compensation purposes). See also Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus.,
246 S.E.2d 907, 912-13 (W. Va. 1978) (overruling an earlier holding that found a "deliberate intent"
means a "specific intent").
Under these alternatives, a "true intentional tort" has been said to occur when an employer
or co-employee "truly intended the injury as well as the act." Id. Moreover, one commentator has
noted that an actual intent to injure implies that the acting party intended the consequences of his or
her conduct. Sheila L. Bimbaum, Workers' Compensation Viewed From the State Level-Inroad in the
Immunity Shield: Employee Tort Actions Against Employers, FINAL EDITED PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND WORKPLACE LIABILrrY, 115, 117 (1981). Mere
constructive intent is insufficient. Id. It is interesting to note that the requisite mens rea for various
forms or degrees of murder or homicide can be satisfied in virtually every jurisdiction without
establishing a specific, subjective intent to kill. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01 (Supp. 1993).
In this light, criminal intent may be inferred from conduct which will not rise to a sufficient level of
culpability to penetrate the shield of immunity under the "true intentional tort" test.
The "substantial certainty" test, which can arguably be said to akin to one of the alternative
standards enunciated in Schlenk. incorporates the definition of "intent" found in the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OFToRTs and denotes "that the actor desires to cause the consequences of his act, or that he
believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 8A (1965). In defining the term "intent," the REsTATEMETrr further instructs that:
All consequences which the actor desires to bring about are intended ....
Intent is not.
however, limited to consequences which are desired. If the actor knows that the
consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes
ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result. As the
probability that the consequences will follow decreases, and becomes less than
substantial certainty, the actor's conduct loses the character of intent, and becomes mere
recklessness .... As the probability decreases further and amounts only to a risk that the
result will follow, it becomes ordinary negligence ....
Id. cmt. b. Cf Johnson v. Micra (In re Micra), 926 F.2d 741, 744 (8th Cir. 1991); Dahlgren & Co. v.
Lacina (In re Lacina), 162 B.R. 267, 275 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1993) (applying the RESTATEMENT
"substantial certainty" test in order to ascertain whether the actor's conduct amounted to a "willful" and
"malicious" "injury" and therefore falls within the exception to the general rule of dischargeability of
debts).
Proponents of the "substantial certainty" test contend that in order to remove the immunity
bar, the injurious conduct must be undertaken with a subjective realization of the risk of bodily harm.
See, e.g., Mandolidis, 246 S.E.2d at 913-14. Such a standard, it is argued, imports knowledge or
premeditation that an injury is to be the probable result of a particular course of conduct or of an
omission to act. See id. at 914. "Negligence," by contrast, conveys the notion of inadvertence rather
than a consciousness or premeditation. Id.

942

9NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

b.

[VOL. 70:4

Hulne v. InternationalHarvester Co.,
496 F. Supp. 849 (D.N.D. 1980)
The plaintiff in Hulne v. International Harvester Co. 147 was the
surviving spouse of a worker who was fatally injured when the tractor
truck and trailer he was operating in connection with his employment
left the road and rolled over. 14 8 Although applying for and receiving
workers' compensation benefits, the plaintiff brought suit directly against
the decedent's principal officer at the time of the incident seeking to
recover for injuries which were not covered by workers' compensation.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant, in ordering the modification of
the frame of the tractor, knowingly created a danger which was so gross
as to be tantamount to an actual intent to injure.1 49 The defendant
moved for summary judgment, seeking the dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint and cause of action. In support of the motion, the defendant
argued that a common-law suit was barred by the exclusive-remedy
provisions of the North Dakota Workers' Compensation Act.150
The plaintiff did not dispute well-established precedent which held
that the exclusive-remedy provisions of the Act generally preclude any
common-law action against either an employer or co-employee when the
employer has secured workers' compensation coverage. 151 Instead, the
plaintiff contended that there existed an exception to the bar of civil suits
in circumstances in which the alleged negligence was so gross as to be
the equivalent of an actual intent to injure.1 5 2 The gravamen of the
plaintiff's complaint was that the doctrine of exclusivity was inapplicable
in the instant case since the defendant's conduct fell within the scope of
the aforementioned exception.
The United States District Court for the District of North Dakota,
applying North Dakota law, granted defendant's summary judgment
motion and entered an order dismissing the complaint and cause of
action. 1 53 Although the district court expressly refrained from
determining whether an exception for intentional or willful injuries
existed under North Dakota law, it assumed, arguendo, that an exception
to exclusivity existed in order to address the plaintiff's contentions. 154

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

496 F. Supp. 849 (D.N.D. 1980).
Hulne v. International Harvester Co., 496 F. Supp. 849, 850 (D.N.D. 1980).
Id. at 852.
Id. at 851.
Id. at 852.
Id.
Hulne, 496 F. Supp. at 853.
Id. at 852.
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The district court quoted a passage from the Schlenk decision and
concluded that allegations of gross negligence were insufficient to give
rise to the application of a "public-policy" exception.155 The district
court relied on the Schlenk decision for precedent and, in doing so,
opined that the "plaintiff does not seriously allege that [the] defendant ...
manifested an actual intent to kill or injure the decedent." 156 The court
determined that the pled allegations fell short of a claim of "intentional
wrongdoing."157 Based upon the foregoing, the district court concluded
that it was "clear" that the North Dakota Workers' Compensation Act
barred the plaintiffs common-law action. 158
The summary dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint in Hulne was
unquestionably the correct result, especially since the plaintiff subjected
herself to the rights, remedies, and limitations provided in the Act by
applying for and receiving workers' compensation benefits. 159 By doing
so, the plaintiff, however unwittingly, affirmatively asserted the
"accidental" nature of the injuries. Nonetheless, the federal district court
arguably misinterpreted -the North Dakota Supreme Court's view of the
potential public-policy exception to exclusivity for intentional or willful
injuries as espoused in Schlenk. The district court seemed to misread
Schlenk insofar as it impliedly found that the case dicta stood for the
proposition that only a conscious, subjective intent to injure could satisfy
the aforementioned public-policy exception under North Dakota law.
Such an interpretation of the Schlenk opinion seems unduly parsimonious. As previously set forth, the North Dakota Supreme Court expressly
acknowledged in Schlenk that the shield of immunity could possibly be
pierced, and thereby potentially enable an injured worker to maintain a
cause of action at law for the injuries'sustained, in cases in which the
"negligence was so gross as to be equivalent to an actual intent to injure"
as well as in cases in which a conscious, subjective intent to injure was
demonstrated. Significantly, nowhere in the district court's. opinion in

155. Id. at 852-53.
156. Id. at 852.
157. Id. The district court further noted that the plaintiff "elected" to pursue workers'
compensation as her sole remedy since she applied for and received benefits. Id. at 853. The court
cited Schlenk and noted that "[oince the employee or his beneficiaries have received workmen's
compensation benefits, they are precluded from pursuing a common law action, even for intentionally
inflicted injuries." Id. (emphasis added). In further articulating its position, the court stated that "[ilt
is
immaterial that the pain and suffering injuries sought in [the] action are not compensable under the
act." Id. (emphasis added). The court held that a plaintiff cannot collaterally attack a decision by the
workers' compensation bureau which had already determined the injuries to be compensable under the
Act. Id.
158. Id.
159. See supra notes 92-109 and accompanying text.
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Hulne is there any discussion or analysis of this potential exception to
exclusivity as espoused by Chief Justice Erickstad in Schlenk.
c.

Schreder v. Cities Service Co.,
336 N.W.2d 641 (N.D. 1983)
In Schreder v. Cities Service Co.,160 the worker's widow brought a
wrongful death action against the decedent's employer and fellow
employee.161 The decedent was employed by the TRG Drilling
Corporation and was fatally injured while operating machinery which
malfunctioned. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants either knew or
should have known that the equipment the decedent was operating at the
time of his death was not functioning properly, and pointed to
corroborating evidence which seemed to support her assertion.16 2 The
gravamen of the complaint was that requiring the decedent to operate
knowingly malfunctioning equipment was negligence so gross that it
amounted to an actual intent to injure. 163 The defendants filed a motion
for summary judgment contending that the plaintiff could not maintain
a common-law cause of action because the complaint was barred as a
matter of law by the exclusive-remedy provisions of the North Dakota
Workers' Compensation Act. 164
Justice Vande Walle, writing for a unanimous court, prefaced his
analysis by noting that the court in Schlenk had "held" that the North
Dakota Workers' Compensation Act itself did not allow for an exception
to the immunity afforded an employer or its agents when an employee's
injuries are intentionally inflicted. 16 5 In order to lay the foundation for
the court's opinion which was premised upon whether public policy
required recognition of an exception to exclusivity, Justice Vande Walle
quoted the federal district court decision of Hulne. 166 The court opined
that Hulne set forth a distinction for compensation purposes between an
intentional tort and an intentional injury since "not all intentional torts
are intentional injuries."167 An intent to commit a tort which results in
injury cannot, opined the court, in all cases be said to be the same as an
intent to injure. The North Dakota Supreme Court specifically rejected

160. 336 N.W.2d 641 (N.D. 1983).
161. Schreder v. Cities Serv. Co., 336 N.W.2d 641, 642 (N.D. 1983).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 642. Interestingly, Justice Vande Walle was not a member of the panel which
decided Schlenk.
166. Schreder, 336 N.W.2d at 643.
167. Id.
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the premise that an injured employee covered by workers' compensation
may institute a civil suit for all intentional torts without regard to whether
or not there existed "an actual intent to injure." 168 By distinguishing an
intentional injury from an intentional tort, the court completely closed
the door on the latter as amounting to an exception to the rule of
exclusivity in North Dakota. Thus, the court concluded that the
application of the exclusive-remedy provisions to the undisputed facts of
the case led to the inescapable conclusion that the defendants were
immune from a common-law action which sought damages.1 6 9 The
holding was premised in part on the fact that the employee's death was
precipitated by an "accident" and was not the result of "an actual intent to
injure." 170
The North Dakota Supreme Court expressly left open the issue of
whether public policy necessitated an exception to the exclusivity of the
North Dakota Workers' Compensation Act.171 Once again, the court
deliberately skirted resolving whether an injured employee was permitted
to maintain a common-law action against a fellow employee or an
employer for an intentional injury because it was clear that no intentional "injury" had been proven.1 72 The North Dakota Supreme Court did,
however, adhere to the conclusion it previously set forth in Schlenk
which found that "an actual intent to injure" could conceivably serve as a
basis for moving an injury from the requisite category of "accidental,"
and thereby permitting an injured employee to pursue a common-law
remedy directly against an employer or co-employee for injuries that are
intentionally inflicted.' 73 At least one recent decision in North Dakota,
while again refusing to rule on the existence of an intentional-injury
exception to exclusivity, has reaffirmed the necessity of an actual intent
74
to injure standard.1

168. Schreder, 336 N.W.2d at 643.
169. Id. The court was quick to point out that the plaintiff-widow in Schreder had previously
received $18,486.42 in compensation benefits from the North Dakota Workmen's Compensation
Bureau. Id. at 642.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 643.
173. Schreder, 336 N.W.2d at 643-44.
174. See Smith v. Vestal, 494 N.W.2d 370, 374-75 (N.D. 1992). In Smith, The North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the summary dismissal of a defendant's cross-claim and third-party indemnity
and contribution action for fraud and deceit against the employer of a worker who was fatally injured
by the collapse of a silo. Id. at 376. The defendant argued that an exception to exclusivity should exist
and allow contribution in cases where the employer commits fraud against a third party and a
subsequent injury results. Id. at 373. Chief Justice Erickstad, writing for a unanimous court, stated in
dicta: "Inboth Schlenk and Schreder we expressly refused to allow an exception to the exclusive
remedy rule for any conduct less than an actual intent to injure before allowing a common law action
against the employer." Id. at 374.
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Despite the fact that the Schlenk, Hulne, & Schreder trilogy of
decisions set forth in dicta the broad parameters of an intentional-injury
exception, the precise elements of any such exception in North Dakota
remain elusive. More significantly, the fundamental issue of whether an
exception to exclusivity actually exists for an intentional injury under
North Dakota law continues to remain an open question.' 7 5 The North
Dakota Supreme Court has been reticent to engage in judicial legislation
by establishing an exception to exclusivity for intentionally inflicted
injuries. The judicial reluctance to adopt such an exception is quite
understandable since any standard that tends to erode the exclusiveness
of the compensation remedy strikes at the very heart of the statutory
scheme and threatens the viability of the fixed terms of a carefully
calibrated legislative bargain.
V.

FOUNDATION FOR AN "INTENTIONAL-INJURY"
EXCEPTION
A court is certainly not free to disregard the rule of exclusivity
which is firmly entrenched in the North Dakota Workers' Compensation
Act by judicially declaring the existence of a remedy previously
removed from the sphere of available common-law actions. However, in
a compulsory, no-fault system which relegates injured employees solely
to accident recovery, it would seem doubtful that any legislature
intended to completely abrogate an employee's right to recover damages
in a civil action. It is equally true that precluding injured workers from
maintaining tort claims directly against their employers or co-employees
by virtue of a blind and rigid adherence to the rule of exclusivity cannot
be justified in all instances.
Workers' compensation was specifically designed to provide an
alternative system of compensation for those risks inherent in the
workplace. Workers' compensation statutes prescribe standards for
segregating compensable work-related injuries from those that are not
compensable in order to carve out strictly employment risks from the
general body of hazards that beset all humankind.' 76 It is clear that the
workers' compensation statutes in North Dakota were designed to
provide an alternative compensation system primarily for those injuries
arising out of and in the course of employment which are accidental in

175. Gerand v. Ost Servs., Inc., 298 N.W.2d 500. 504 (N.D. 1980) (noting that there are "some
exceptions to the exclusive remedy rule").
176. LrrrLa Er At-, supra note 8. at 186.
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nature. 17 7 The "accident" requirement is the benchmark by which the
boundary and applicability of the exclusive-remedy rule should
generally be measured. An examination of the origin and evolution of
the law of workers' compensation unequivocally supports this proposition for most work-related injuries.17 8
The sole function of exclusivity in workers'. compensation is to
impart efficacy to the compensation bargain.179 Although the workers'
compensation bargain clearly contemplates a reciprocal yielding of
common-law rights for new and enlarged rights and remedies, the quid
pro quo concerns work-related "accidents"; intentionally injurious
conduct by an employer or co-employee was not a part of the bargain.
The original bargain never contemplated the relinquishment of an
employee's common-law rights for intentionally caused injuries which
were by way of legal definition unaffected by the traditional common-law defenses available to an employer or co-employee in a
negligence action.18 0 Simply because a legislature intended through the
enactment of workers' compensation legislation to limit and diffuse
liability for accidental injuries does not likewise compel the conclusion
that a legislature intended to limit and diffuse liability for intentional
injuries.181 Intended wrongs introduce an ingredient of "moral hazard"
which was never intended to be governed exclusively by a set of rules

- 177. See N.D. CErT. CODE § 65-01-02(9) (Supp. 1993) (defining a compensable injury to be "an
injury by accident"). See also id. §§ 65-01-02(9)(b)(1) (self-inflicted injuries), (2) (injuries caused by
willful use of controlled substances), (3) (injuries incurred by act of aggression) (Supp. 1993)
(evidencing the legislative view that certain categories of intentional injuries are not compensable).
The foregoing provisions illustrate that intent plays a significant role in ascertaining whether an injury
is compensable.
.178. See supra notes 6-32 and accompanying text
179. Shoemaker v. Myers. 801 P.2d 1054, 1062 (Cal. 1990).
180. Edward J. O'Connell, Jr., Note, Intentional Employer Misconduct and Pennsylvania's
Exclusive Remedy Rule After Poyser v. Newman and Co.: A Proposalfor Legislative Reform, 49 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 1127, 1129-30 (1988).
Worker's compensation statutes were enacted to furnish exclusive coverage for injuries
that resulted from an employer's negligent failure to provide safe working conditions for
hired employees. There is no evidence that employer [or co-employee] actions
amounting to more than negligence or gross negligence were similarly intended to be
affected by workers' compensation legislation. The common law defenses of
'contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, and fellow servant doctrine precluded an
injured employee from recovering on a claim of employer negligence. These defenses,
however, could not be invoked when an employee initiated an action for intentional
misconduct.
Id. at 1152-53 (footnotes omitted). See id. at 1153 n.156 (citing authority which observes that the
traditional common-law defenses have little or no application to deliberate or willful misconduct).
, 181. Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co., 398 N.W.2d 882, 889 (Mich. 1986). See Fermino v.
Fedco, Inc.., 872 P.2d 559 (Cal. 1994) (noting that in calibrating the compensation bargain legislatures
were focused on eradicating concepts of common-law negligence; consequently, common-law
intentional torts were not explicitly addressed in the workers' compensation system).
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specifically designed to redress accidental injuries. Similarly, intentional

harms are not the type of wrongs intended to be a bar to maintaining a
common-law suit against an employer or employee notwithstanding the
breadth of the exclusive-remedy provisions of most compensation acts.
It is further arguable that interpreting the provisions of the North Dakota
Workers' Compensation Act in a fashion which abrogates an injured
employee's cause of action in tort for intentional harms cannot be made
in all circumstances without running afoul of fundamental principles
82
embodied in the North Dakota Constitution.1
To view intentional harms as an inevitable accompaniment of
industrial production, whose costs, like any other cost of production,
should be borne exclusively by the industry and ultimately by the
consumer would seem repugnant to the very purpose for which workers'
compensation legislation was promulgated. Intentionally injurious
conduct would seem to be the type of behavior that every legislature in
the United States would most want to discourage.I 8 3 Subjecting
intentional harms to the rule of exclusivity would be counterproductive
to that end and would in essence allow intentional tortfeasors to shift
their liability to a fund generally financed with employer-paid

182. See, e.g., N.D. CONST. art. I § 9 ("All courts shall be open, and every man for any injury
done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have a remedy by due process of law. ...");
N.D. CONST. art. I § 13 ("The right of trial by jury shall be secured to all, and remain inviolate."). At
least one court has recognized that constitutional principles mandate an exception to exclusivity for
intentional injuries:
Notwithstanding the breadth of [the act's] terms, its evident purpose was to confine its
operation to only accidental injuries, and its scope is to be so limited .... The Bill of
Rights, Section 13, Article I of the Constitution provides that "every person for an injury
done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of
law." . . . It is therefore not to be doubted that the Legislature is without the power to
deny the citizen the right to resort to the courts for the redress of any intentional injury to
his person by another. Such a cause of action may be said to be protected by the
Constitution and could not be taken away .... This Act does not affect the right or
redress for that class of wrongs. The injuries, or wrongs, with which it deals are
accidental injuries or wrongs.
Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 185 S.W. 556, 560 (1916), affd, 249 U.S. 152 (1919). Cf.
Smith v. Gould. Inc., 918 F.2d 1361. 1364 (8th Cir. 1990) (noting in dicta that the constitutionality of
many early compensation statutes did not depend upon the existence of an exception to exclusivity for
intentional injuries).
The plaintiff in Hulne v. International Harvester Co., 496 F. Supp. 849 (D.N.D. 1980)
attempted to raise a similar constitutional argument. The Federal District Court of North Dakota ruled.
however, that the receipt of compensation benefits under the statutory scheme effectively forecloses
such a contention: "Generally, a party who takes advantage of the provisions of a law cannot question
its constitutionality." id. at 853 (citing International Printing Pressman & Assistants Union v. Meier,
115 N.W.2d 18, 20 (N.D. 1962)).
183. If one of the avowed purposes of workers' compensation is to promote safety in the
workplace, subjecting workers to the rule of exclusivity for intentionally injurious misconduct certainly
would not promote that end for an employer could engage in egregious conduct with virtual impunity
and rest safe with the knowledge that, at the very most, workers' compensation premiums may
increase slightly. Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., Inc., 433 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Ohio 1982).
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premiums.184 Such a result permits an employer to effectively "cost-out"
18 5
safety issues in disregard of potential injuries as investment decisions.
The immunity afforded by workers' compensation should not give
employers the unfettered right to carry on their enterprises without
regard to the life and limb of those who serve in their employ.
Furthermore, a tortfeasor who affirmatively commits an intentionally
tortious act such as an assault can not reasonably aver that the resultant
86
injury is a risk or condition incident to the employment.
In light of the foregoing, an employee's common-law right of
action for intentional injuries should not be deemed destroyed in the
absence of clear language in a statutory provision which commands such
a result.' 8 7 It would indeed be a subversion of the workers' compensation laws to allow intentional wrongdoers to utilize the provisions of the
workers' compensation statutes to shield themselves from those torts

184. Collier v. Wagner Castings Co., 408 N.E.2d 198 (III. 1980). The rationale for an
intentional-injury exception becomes even more palatable when suit is brought against a fellow
servant who, by virtue of his or her position, has not directly contributed in premiums to the fund that
supports compensation coverage. As one court has so aptly noted: "In Workers' Compensation, the
immunities of the law inure to those who accept the liabilities imposed therein." Schwartz v. Zippy
Mart, 470 So. 2d 720, 725 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
185. Blankenship, 433 N.E.2d at 579 (Celebrezze, C.J., concurring). The North Dakota Supreme
Court has expressed the concern that if the effect of the rule of exclusivity embodied in the North
Dakota Workers' Compensation Act was to preclude an employee from suing an employer for
intentionally tortious injuries and thereby enable the employer to "'cost-out' an investment decision to
kill workers," it may indeed "be a powerful incentive for the Legislature to amend our current law."
Schreder v. Cities Serv. Co., 336 N.W.2d 641. 643 n.2 (N.D. 1983).
186. "No reasonable individual would equate intentional and unintentional conduct in terms of the
degree of risk which faces an employee nor would such an individual contemplate the risk of an
intentional tort as a natural risk of employment." Blankenship, 433 N.E.2d at 576.
187. See State v. E.W. Wylie Co., 58 N.W.2d 76. 83 (N.D. 1953) ("An existing common-law
right is not to be taken away by statute unless by direct enactment or necessary implication."). This
view has been embraced by at least one state district court in North Dakota. See Lautt v. Maloney,
No. 92941, slip op. (Grand Forks Dist. Ct. 1992). In Lautt, the plaintiff was employed as a bookkeeper
for National Muffler Shops, Inc., in Grand Forks. North Dakota. The defendant was employed as the
manager of the same entity. On May 24, 1991, a work-related argument ensued between the plaintiff
and the defendant at their place of employment. The argument turned into an altercation where the
defendant was the initial aggressor-plaintiff, immediately after a verbal exchange, retreated into an
office and sat behind a desk with his back to the door; the defendant after a brief lapse of time entered
the office and assaulted the plaintiff from behind. Following the altercation, the plaintiff terminated
his employment and filed a criminal complaint against the defendant with the Grand Forks Police
Department. The plaintiff did not attempt to collect workers' compensation, although presumably he
would have been successful in his attempt. On September 27, 1991, the defendant pled guilty to a
criminal assault charge. The plaintiff subsequently brought suit against the defendant individually due
to injuries sustained as a direct result of the aforementioned altercation. The defendant brought a
motion for summary judgment arguing that no common-law cause of action could be maintained
against the defendant individually due to the exclusive-remedy provisions of the state's workers'
compensation provisions. The Grand Forks District Court held, inter alia, that the defendant could not
use..the provisions of workers' compensation as a shield for an intentional assault which he initiated.
Id. The court found that the exclusivity bar could not be utilized as a sword by a tortfeasor who
commits, an intentionally injurious act. Accordingly, the court denied the motion for summary
judgment and allowed the plaintiff to maintain a common-law action. Id.
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which are tantamount to intentional or willful injuries in the absence of a
188
clear legislative mandate.
The "accident" requirement insures that the workers' compensation
statutes are not utilized in a way for employers and fellow employees to
benefit from their own intentional misconduct. 189 One who inflicts an
intentional injury upon an employee either directly or indirectly by
commanding or authorizing such conduct cannot logically claim that it
was accidental. 190 This would be especially true in light of the fact that
the very same conduct may readily be found to be criminally punishable
in another forum. 19 1 Affirmatively tortious conduct which rises to the
level of criminal assault should readily be sufficient enough to establish
"an actual intent to injure" which, as noted in dicta by Schlenk and its
progeny, is necessary to remove any challenge to a common-law action
based upon the exclusive-remedy provisions of the workers' compensation statutes.
Almost every jurisdiction, either by express statutory provision or
judicial construction, recognizes an intentional-injury exception to the
exclusive-remedy rule in some form. 192 Courts in other jurisdictions
which have specifically addressed the matter on this point are relatively
uniform in opining:
The Workmen's Compensation Law deals not with intentional
wrongs but with only accidental injuries. We entertain not the
slightest doubt that where an employer, either directly or
through an agent or servant, is guilty of a[n] . . . assault upon
an employee, he cannot relegate the latter to the compensation
statute as the sole remedy for his tortious act. It would be

188. Application of the principle of exclusivity in such cases has been characterized as "a
travesty on the use of the English language" and "a perversion of the purposes of the acL" 2A LARSON,
supra note 8, § 68.12, at 13-10 (footnotes omitted).
189. Beauchamp, 398 N.W.2d at 887.
190. See 2A LARSON, supra note 8, § 68.11, at 13-4. Compare Deutsch v. Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 452 N.Y.S.2d 469, 470 (1982) (an exception to the exclusiveness of the
compensation remedy can be found where an employer instigates or authorizes an assault upon an
employee), with Bakker v. Baza'r, Inc., 551 P.2d 1269, 1273-74 (Or. 1976) (ratification of an assault
was insufficient to create an exception to exclusivity).
191. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE.§§ 12.1-17-01 to 12.1-17-02 (1985) (setting forth the provisions
for criminal assault in North Dakota).
192. Higgins, supra note 23, at 37-38; Li.rLE ETrAL., supra note 8, at 430 n. 1. A growing number
of jurisdictions has promulgated statutory provisions which expressly preserve an employee's
common-law right of action against an employer or co-employee for specified categories of conduct
beyond mere negligence. See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1022 (West Supp. 1983); CAL. LAB. CODE §
3602 (West 1971 & Supp. 1988); IDAHO CODE § 72-209 (1973); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.610(3), (4)
(Baldwin 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §23:1032 (West 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 281:12(11)
(1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-8 (West Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFiED LAws ANN. § 62-3-2 (1993);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 51.24.020 (1981); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1985).
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abhorrent to our sense of justice to hold that an employer [or
his/her servants] may assault [an] employee and then compel
the injured work[er] to accept the circumstance, the one
assaulted may avail himself [or herself] of a common law
action against [the] assailant where full monetary satisfaction
193
may be obtained.
The vast majority of courts have thus manifested their collective
unwillingness to include intentionally injurious conduct by employers or
their servants within the rule of exclusivity since there is no "sound
reason" to conclude that any legislature intended to limit the liability of
an intentional tortfeasor when formulating legislation directed at
redressing accidental injuries.1 9 4 North Dakota, however, stands virtually
alone in that the existence or nonexistence of such an exception has not
been resolved to any degree of certainty.
VI. RECONCILING THE COMPENSATION vs. COMMON LAW
DICHOTOMY
Reconciling the notion that an injury which flows from a workplace
assault between co-workers or between an employer and a subordinate is
and indeed should be compensable under the workers' compensation

193. Heskett v. Fisher Laundry & Cleaners Co., 230 S.W.2d 28, 31 (Ark. 1950) (quoting Lavin v.
Goldberg Material Corp.. 87 N.Y.S.2d 90. 93 (1949)). See Boek v. Wong Hing, 231 N.W 233, 233
(Minn. 1930) (finding it to be a "perversion of the purpose" of the workers' compensation statutes to
permit a fellow employee who willfully assaults a worker to successfully interpose the
exclusive-remedy provisions of the workers' compensation statutes as a defense which thereby
relegates an injured to less than full recovery). See also Elliott v. Brown, 569 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Alaska
1977) (holding that "the socially beneficial purpose of the workmen's compensation law would not be
furthered by allowing a person who commits an intentional tort to use the compensation law as a shield
against liability"); Schwartz v. Zippy Mart, Inc., 470 So. 2d 720,724 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (opining
that "[an employer, of course, cannot intentionally injure an employee and enjoy immunity from suit..
. Similarly, an employer cannot command or expressly authorize the intentional infliction of an injury
upon an employee and still claim the exclusive remedy provisions of the compensation act").
194, Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co., 398 N.W.2d 882, 890 (Mich. 1986). Other legal theories
to support the same result have been advanced in jurisdictions which do not require the injury to be
accidental. One is that the assailant severs the employment relation by the particular act of violence.
2A LARSON, supra note 8. § 68.11, at 13-4. See. e.g., Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp., 576 N.E.2d 722.
729 (Ohio 1991) ("When an employer intentionally harms his employee, that act effects a complete
breach of the employment relationship, and for purposes of the legal remedy for such an injury, the
two parties are not employer and employee, but intentional tortfeasor and victim."); Boek v. Wong
Hing, 231 N.W. 233, 234 (Minn. 1930). A second treats such an assault as if the conduct does not
"arise out of the employment." 2A LARSON, supra note 8, § 68.11 , at 13-5. Both of these theories.
however, are essentially fictitious; hence, the most satisfactory view is the nonaccidental theory. Id. at
13-6. In addition to these theories, policy justifications have often been resorted to in order to justify
an exception to the general rule of exclusivity. Id. § 68.12, at 13-9. For example. a New York court
has stated: "It would be anomalous to permit a defendant which, as in this case ....
assaulted the
plaintiff herein, to say, 'I can assault you with impunity and the only remedy you have is to take
Workmen's Compensation .... '" Garcia v. Gusmack Restaurant Corp., 150 N.Y.S.2d 232, 233 (1954).
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acts as an accidental injury, with the idea that a common-law action may
be maintained directly against the assailant as an exception to exclusivity
since the injury is intentional, appears at first blush to be conceptually
troublesome. For if such an injury can logically be said to be compensable on the one hand under the provisions of the workers' compensation
act, should not the exclusive-remedy provisions bar any common-law
action against an employer or his/her servants? More specifically, how
can the very same injury or conduct giving rise to an injury be fairly
characterized under the law as both accidental and intentional? These
questions become particularly perplexing when examining authority
which interprets the exclusive-remedy provisions effectively to preclude
an employee whose injuries fall within the scope of the Act from electing
whether or not to receive compensation or bring suit against his or her
employer.1 95 Additionally problematic is the fact the exclusive-remedy
provisions on their face appear to bar virtually all tort litigation against
either an employer or co-employee in North Dakota.
The answer to the aforementioned questions ostensibly still lies in
the hands of the injured employee in most jurisdictions. If the employee
has elected to accept the benefits of workers' compensation by filing a
claim, the claimant has essentially asserted the "accidental" nature of the
particular injury.1 9 6 The injured employee, by applying for and
receiving workers' compensation benefits, triggers the applicability of the
legal fiction created by the courts in order to allow intentional torts to be
classified as "accidental" and thereby fall within the coverage formula of
the various compensation acts. However, if the injured worker forgoes
any claim for workers' compensation and elects to proceed to court in an
action for damages against the assailant directly, it is the assailant who
must affirmatively plead the exclusiveness of the particular conduct as a

195. See, e.g., United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149, 151 (1966); Hoerr v. Northfield Foundry &
Mach. Co.. 376 N.W.2d 323 (N.D. 1985) (noting that the right to recovery granted for employees
whose injuries fall within the scope of workers' compensation coverage is exclusively limited to the
statutory scheme). See supra notes 92-109 and accompanying text.
196. 2A LARSON, supra note 8, § 68.12, at 13-12 n.9.
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defense. 197 To do so, the assailant must allege that the injury producing
incident was an "accident" -and how can this be accomplished, when it is
the assailant who has deliberately brought the injury about? 198 It would
indeed seem contrary to reason to allow an employer or co-employee to
classify an injury that he or she intentionally inflicted as an accident in
order to trigger the exclusivity bar. "Thus, from the point of view of the
person who, as a matter of pleading, must allege the accidental character
of the injury, the occurrence was not accidental but intentional." 199 A
number of courts, under such circumstances, have recast the intentional
injury as nonaccidental in order to justify an exception to exclusivity
and permit a plaintiff to advance a tort action.
A great number of decisions in this area regard the statutory
recovery of compensation and tort recovery of damages to be mutually
exclusive alternatives. The theory is premised upon the widely-accepted
view that the two remedies, workers' compensation for an accidental
injury and tort for an intentional injury, are inconsistent and the pursuit
of either remedy to fruition bars the right to pursue the other.2 00 This, in
turn, puts the injured employee to an election of remedies for all
practical purposes as to whether to proceed in tort in an attempt to
collect damages or to claim compensation through the workers'

197. Id. at 13-12.
198. Id. See. e.g., Jablonski v. Multack. 380 N.E.2d 924 (II1. 1978) (finding that a co-employee,
like an employer, cannot be heard to label an injury "accidental" that he himself intentionally
inflicted). In construing the "accident" requirement in such circumstances, courts have defined it from
the actor's point of view and rejected arguments that the "accident" requirement be viewed from
employee's perspective. By contrast, the "accident" requirement is viewed quite differently when it is
the injured employee who asserts the accidental nature of a particular injury: "An assault is an
'accident' within the meaning of the workmen's compensation acts when from the point of view of the
workman who suffers from it it is unexpected and without design on his part, although intentionally
caused by another." 6 SCHNEIDER, supra note 20,§ 1560, at 117. See 82 AM. JUR. 2D §§ 245-50 (1992);
Alice M. Thomas, The Law of Workers' Compensation: Defining Accidental Injury, 30 How. L.J. 515
(1987); 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation §§ 153-61 (1958); SAMUEL B. HoROvITZ, INJURY AND DEATH
UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAws, at 84-93 (1944); HONNOLD. supra note 66, § 85: Francis H.
Bolen, A Problem in the Drafting of Workmen's Compensation Acts. 25 HARV. L. REV. 328 (1912)
(discussing the "accident" requirement and concomitant interpretation thereof under the workers'
compensation acts).
199. 2A LARSON, supra note 8,§ 68.12, at 13-12. Larson notes that there is nothing inconsistent
about such a result, although seemingly curious on its face, since it is common to analyze the particular
incident in the context of the type of action from the standpoint of the individual who has the burden of
establishing or defending the case in question. Id.
200. An unsuccessful pursuit of a either a compensation or damages remedy does not generally
bar the pursuit of the other. The rationale in such situations is that an election of a remedy which
ultimately proves to be nonexistent cannot be fairly said to be an election at all: "Election . . . is a
choice between two valid but inconsistent remedies: it is not the mistaken pursuit of a misconceived
right when only one right in fact existed." 2A LARSON. supra note 8,§ 67.31 at 12-157.
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compensation provisions. 201 The doctrine of election as applied to
questions regarding the exclusiveness of the workers' compensation
remedy has been expressed thusly:
The doctrine of election, usually predicated of inconsistent
remedies, consists in holding the party, to whom several courses
were open for obtaining relief, to his first election, where
subsequently he attempts to avail himself of some further and
other remedy not consistent with, but contradictory of, his
previous attitude and action upon his claim. The basis for the
application of the doctrine is in the proposition that where
there is, by law or contract, a choice between two remedies,
which proceed upon opposite and irreconcilable claims of
right, the one taken must exclude and bar the prosecution of
20 2
the other.
Hence, an employee is essentially forced to a binding and
conclusive election between claiming compensation or suing the assailant
directly for damages under the common law even though such an option
is not supposed to exist under the law. 20 3 The binding election occurs
when the employee applies for and receives benefits under workers'

201. The rationale of those courts which steadfastly adhere to the election of remedies doctrine
as applied to questions of exclusivity in workers compensation generally opine:
There is a distinction between "being entitled to take compensation" and 'having taken
compensation." Assuming the plaintiff had a common-law action for willful assault, we
think he lost such a remedy by choosing instead to avail himself of the benefits of
work[ers'] compensation, given to him by the statute without requiring him to prove
negligence, freedom from contributory negligence, willful assault or anything else
except that he was injured during the course of his employment .... The statute gave
him a remedy. That remedy was predicated upon the theory that his injury was
'accidental' within the statutory definition. His common-law action negates the theory of
'accidental injury." He bases his cause of action upon a willful and wanton assault by his
employers and on the theory that such assault is not an accidental injury under the statute.
Assuming that he had two remedies, one by virtue of the statute and one under the
common law, it must be held that the two are inconsistent one with the other. He may not
pursue both to conclusion. By demanding, receiving and retaining benefits of his first
remedy, he is estopped to simultaneously pursue the second. He made his election.
Legault v. Brown, 127 N.Y.S.2d 601, 603-04 (1954) (citation omitted). See Williams v. General
Servs. Admin., 582 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Pa. 1984): Irving v. E.F.P.E. Constr. Corp., 337 N.Y.S.2d 4
(1972) (opining that a discovery that the worker was an independent contractor and not an employee
after compensation benefits were received barred an action at law against the employer); Morris v.
Ford Motor Co., 31 N.W.2d 89, 90 (Mich. 1948) (stating that the filing of a claim under workmen's
compensation releases an injured party's claim at law); Wemer v. State, 424 N.E.2d 541 (1981)
(acceptance of compensation precludes maintenance of common-law action based upon an
intentional injury). See generally Schnoor v. Meinecke. 33 N.W.2d 66, 68 (N.D. 1948).
202. Legault. 127 N.Y.S.2d at 604 (quoting Mills v. Parkhurst, 26 N.E. 1041, 1042 (N.Y. 1891)).
203. 2A LAP.soN, supra note 8.§ 68.12, at 13-10. See supra notes 92-109 and accompanying text.
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compensation. 2 04 Under such a view, an employee's receipt of workers'
compensation benefits by law constitutes a waiver of any and all
common-law rights of action which might otherwise be available-even
0
for those injuries which are intentionally inflicted.2 5
Although the law with respect to an exception to exclusivity in
North Dakota remains unsettled, the statutory scheme as presently
constituted as well as the jurisprudence in this area seems to clearly align
itself with the election-of-remedies doctrine. As previously outlined, an
integral component of the exclusive-remedy doctrine in North Dakota is
the seemingly inflexible rule which forecloses an employee from
206
pursuing any other remedy if compensation benefits are received.
This rigid rule is codified by statute in North Dakota and is triggered
when an injured employee obtains relief through the compensation
system.
An approach which forces an injured worker to an election of
2 07
remedies in such circumstances is deficient for a number of reasons.
One deficiency is that a severely injured employee who has nominal
financial resources might be forced to accept the meager provisions of
the workers' compensation system in order to collect certain and speedy
recovery rather than pursue a potentially higher, yet riskier, tort award.
An injured employee who does not have the financial wherewithal to
await the outcome of potentially protracted litigation, despite having a
potentially valid claim under an exception to exclusivity, has no real
alternative but to forego a tort claim. 20 8 Conversely, an injured worker
who in good faith believes that the injury sustained was brought about
by a degree of intent necessary to overcome the exclusiveness bar and
forgoes the compensation claim in order to preserve the common-law

204. David W. Robertson. The Texas Employer's Liability in Tort for Injuries to an Employee
Occurringin the Course of the Employment, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1195, 1211 (1993).
205. See. e.g., Schlenk v. Aerial Contractors, Inc.. 268 N.W.2d 466. 472-73 (N.D. 1978)
(observing that even if an exception to exclusivity existed in North Dakota for intentionally inflicted
injuries, the receipt of compensation constitutes an election of remedies which accordingly precludes
any action at law).
206. See supra notes 92-109 and accompanying text. See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-06
(1985) (barring claims against an employer by an injured employee if the Workers' Compensation
Bureau has already provided compensation or other benefits).
207. The doctrine of election of remedies seems to be incompatible with the notion of an
'exception" to the exclusive-remedy rule. In jurisdictions which contain a statute that precludes the
pursuit of any remedy upon the receipt of compensation benefits as part of their exclusive-remedy
rule, such as North Dakota. as well as purport to acknowledge an "exception" to the rule of exclusivity
for intentional injuries, should not an 'exception" to exclusivity encompass an "exception" to the very
statute which is integral to the rule of exclusivity?
208. Woodson v. Rowland, 407 S.E.2d 222. 234 (N.C. 1991).
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action, risks losing any right to a remedy in compensation due to the
2 09
time bar contained in all compensation acts for prosecuting claims.

Since an election of remedies is essentially tantamount to a waiver
(the pursuit of one remedy bars the pursuit of another), an election
under such circumstances is fundamentally unfair unless the injured
employee has an understanding of what rights are being waived. A
"waiver" has long been defined in American jurisprudence as "an
intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege." 2 10 A voluntary and informed choice is thus the essence of a
waiver. Accordingly, an election of remedies should not be said to be
made unless a realistic "choice" between alternative avenues of recovery
are presented to the employee in the first instance and a conscious
2
intention to waive one such avenue of recovery is made. 11

209. All workers' compensation acts contain the requirement that claims be filed within a
specified period of time from the date of the accident or discovery of the injury. See, e.g., N.D. CENT.
CODE § 65-05-01 (Supp. 1993) (providing a one-year limitation on claims by injured employees and a
two-year limitation if death resulted). These time-based restrictions are akin to statutes of limitation
and are designed to protect employers from the necessity of defending against claims which are too
old to be properly investigated. Section 65-05-01 provides in part:
All original claims for compensation must be filed by the injured employee, or someone
on the injured employee's behalf, within one year after the injury or two years after the
death.... No compensation or benefits may be allowed under this title to any person ...
unless that person, or someone on that person's behalf files a written claim for
compensation or benefits within the time specified in this section.
Id. (emphasis added). Cf. Evejen v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau. 429 N.W.2d 418
(N.D. 1988) (barring a claim as untimely when it was filed more than one year after the date the
worker knew or should have known that headaches were work-related). A number of courts
construe the repose periods as carrying a conclusive presumption that an employer becomes
prejudiced by a late filed claim. LITTLE FT AL., supra note 8, at 406. E.g., Cecil W. Perry, Inc. v.
Lopez, 425 So. 2d 180 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (disallowing a claim filed one day after the expiration
of the limitation period); Asato v. Meadow Gold Dairies-Hawaii, 706 P.2d 13 (Haw. 1985) (opining
that untimely filed claims are barred even if the employer does not allege that the lateness prejudiced
its ability to investigate the claim).
210. Johnson v. Zerbst. 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). See United States v. Olano. 113 S. Ct. 1770.
1777 (1993); Neary v. United States, 998 F.2d 563, 565 (8th Cir. 1993). See also Steckler v. Steckler,
492 N.W.2d 76, 79 (N.D. 1992) ("For a waiver to be effective, it must be a voluntary and intentional
relinquishment and abandonment of a known existing right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege
which, except for such waiver, the party would have enjoyed.").
211. Ramirez v. Pecan Deluxe Candy Co., 839 S.W.2d 101. 106 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
Recognizing the inequity in applying the election-of-remedies doctrine in workers' compensation cases
has prompted at least one court to cogently reason:
The election of remedies doctrine may constitute a bar to relief when one exercises
an informed choice between two or more remedies, rights, or states of facts that are so
inconsistent as to constitute manifest injustice. One's choice between inconsistent
remedies does not amount to an election that will bar further action unless the choice is
made with a full and clear understanding of the problem. facts, and remedies essential to
the free exercise of an intelligent choice.
Id. See id. at 107 (ruling that there was no evidence which demonstrated that the injured employee
made an informed election between workers' compensation benefits and recovery under the
intentional tort exception to exclusivity). Accord Taylor v. Hubbel. 188 F.2d 106, 109 (9th Cir. 1951).
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Another deficiency is that a claimant in all likelihood will often fail
to consult with an attorney and, therefore, will not realize that the filing
of a workers' compensation claim for less than full recovery effectively
bars any further action against an otherwise culpable employer or
co-employee. 2 12 The existence of an exception to exclusivity for
intentional injuries under such circumstances is essentially illusory and
of dubious value. The practical effect of the election-of-remedies
doctrine is, therefore, to afford employers and co-employees immunity
from virtually all tort suits even when egregious or criminal misconduct
is involved. Intentional tortfeasors are thus able to absolve or exculpate
themselves from the consequences of intentional misconduct in certain
circumstances by virtue of their status as employers or co-employees.
Moreover, workers' compensation may effectively afford a criminal
assailant sanctuary from civil liability-a result surely not intended by
2
the framers of workers' compensation legislation. 13

212. For example, a great number of private and public employers (such as universities like the
University of North Dakota) have promulgated rules or policies which require that any employee who
sustains an injury from a compensable accident or event must report that event to the relevant
insurance department on workers' compensation forms. The forms for claiming compensation are
perfunctorily provided any time an employee sustains an injury at the workplace. Interview with
Dianne G. Schmitz, Chief Deputy Clerk for the United States Bankruptcy Court, Fargo, N.D.
(September 30. 1994). Doing so may effectively force the injured employee to an uninformed
election of remedies by subsequently serving as a basis for barring an otherwise cognizable
common-law action.
213. Jones v. VIP Dev. Co., 472 N.E.2d 1046, 1054 (Ohio 1984). An employer or co-employee
who intentionally injures a worker should not be able to avoid liability for traditional common-law
damages on the ground that compensation is available and has been received. The purpose and spirit
of workers' compensation makes it abundantly clear that workers' compensation was never intended to
be a haven for intentionally injurious conduct:
To limit a worker injured by the employer's intentional misconduct to workers'
compensation benefits would actually encourage such conduct. To bar an intentionally
injured worker from the courtroom because he has received such benefits would have
the same effect. An employer in such a case could merely refrain from contesting the
claim, thereby facilitating the receipt of limited compensation, and then reap the rewards
of absolute immunity from further liability. This court will not foster such practices.
Nor will we force an intentionally injured employee to choose which remedy to
pursue. In most cases, practical considerations will compel the worker to accept the
easier, more immediate relief afforded by the Act, even though these benefits do not
fully compensate the worker. Most seriously injured workers are not in a financial
position to wait out a lengthy, expensive, and risky court proceeding to be compensated
for the injury, due to the problems of pressing medical bills, and often the inability to
work. Many will thus be forced by harsh realities to accept workers' compensation. To
consider the receipt of benefits a forfeiture of an employee's right to pursue the
employer in the courts would not only be harsh and unjust, it would also frustrate the
Further, it would allow the employer to escape any
laudable purposes of the Act ....
meaningful responsibility for its abuses.
Id. Accord Millison v. EL. du Pont de Nemours & Co.. 501 A.2d 505. 519 (N.J. 1985).
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VII. PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Workers' compensation legislation was promulgated in order to
ameliorate a social condition. The workers' compensation system
developed during an era when the common law provided little or no
recovery to those workers who were injured as a direct result of their
employment. The original legislative compromise between employers
and employees, however, has not provided an adequate remedy for all
work-related injuries. Indeed, although the principle of "exclusivity" is
undeniably an integral part of the historical quid pro quo between
employers and employees, one need not strain the imagination to readily
conclude that exclusivity can work harsh results and, in certain
circumstances, produce remedies that are wholly inadequate.
This inadequacy can be evidenced by "judicial attempts" 2 14 to
circumvent the exclusive-remedy provisions of workers' compensation
acts by interpreting the statutes in such a manner as to permit or preserve
a common law right of action-and this is especially the case where the
circumstances giving rise to a work-related injury evince an intent to
injure.2 15
The resolution of the inadequacies of the provisions of North
Dakota's workers' compensation statutes, however, should not lie with the
judiciary. Rather, the North Dakota Legislature should take notice of the
judicially created exceptions to the exclusive-remedy provisions, as well
as the North Dakota Supreme Court's acknowledgment thereof, as a
signal that "changing societal conditions require reassessment of the
original compensation system." 2 16 The North Dakota Supreme Court
has labored to avoid tampering with the exclusive-remedy rule embodied
in the North Dakota Workers' Compensation Act. The court has
steadfastly adhered to the view that the appropriate forum for addressing
the concerns regarding the rule of exclusivity is legislative, not judicial:
The public policy encompassing workers' compensation
statutes dictates a broad interpretation of the exclusive-remedy

214. See generally Steven E. Goren, The Workers' Compensation Exclusive Remedy Rule and Its
Exceptions. 71 MICH. BAR J. 59 (Jan. 1992) (highlighting various judicial exceptions to the
exclusive-remedy provisions).
215. See Leonard. supra note 11. at 557.
216. Id. at 559. The workers' compensation provisions of a majority of jurisdictions, including
North Dakota's. have existed without material alteration since their promulgation. See generally
Marlow, supra note 30,at 158.
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rule. If the barrier is to be pierced it should be done by the
legislature, which is the policy-making body of our govern17
ment. 2

A.

HOUSE BILL

1302: A

PREVIOUS LEGISLATIVE EFFORT

In the wake of two arguably conflicting decisions (Schlenk &
Hulne, supra), the North Dakota Legislature attempted to promulgate
legislation aimed at providing an exception to the rule of exclusivity for
intentionally injurious conduct. On January 26, 1983, a bill was
presented in the North Dakota House of Representatives to the
Committee of Industry, Business and Labor which would have provided
for an exception to the rule of exclusivity embodied in the North Dakota
Workers' Compensation Act. 2 18 House Bill 1302 was an unsuccessful
attempt to amend and reenact Section 65-01-08 of the North Dakota
Century Code 2 19 by adding the following provision: "However, if the
injury or death was caused by the gross negligence or willful or wanton
misconduct of the employer, the right of action against the employer is
not abolished." 2 2 0 The committee minutes reveal that the bill was
intended to respond to situations in which the negligence on the part of
the employer was so gross as to be the functional equivalent of an actual
intent to injure. 2 2 1 Not surprisingly, the proposed amendment to
exclusivity was met with strong resistance. The opposition to House Bill
1302 was predicated, at least in part, upon the misconstrued view that:

217. Smith v. Vestal, 494 N.W.2d 370, 375 (N.D. 1992).
218. H. B. 1302, 48TH Lao. (1983). House Bill 1302 was presented for consideration
approximately six months prior to the decision of the North Dakota Supreme Court in Schreder v.
Cities Serv. Co., 336 N.W.2d 641 (N.D. 1983). Although the court in Schreder was cognizant of the
attempted amendment, it opined that "action by a subsequent Legislature in attempting to amend a
statute cannot be taken as proof of what a previous Legislature intended when it enacted the original
statute and that the intent of the Legislature in the enactment of the law is to be ascertained primarily
from the language of the law." Schreder, 336 N.W.2d at 643 n.2.
219. Section 65-01-08 of the North Dakota Century Code is a statutory component of the
exclusive-remedy rule. See supra note 21.
220. H. B. 1302,48TH LEo. (1983).
221. Id. The transcription of the taped committee minutes, which provides an indication of the
purpose of the proposed amendment, seems to come close to parroting one of the seemingly
alternative standards set forth in Schlenk v. Aerial Contractors, Inc., 268 N.W.2d 466 (N.D. 1978).
The minutes contain the statement that:
This bill is intended to respond to the situations in which gross negligance [sic]
occured [sic] on the part of the employer, so bad that it appears that the employer
intended it.... Gross negligence is when someone does something so bad that you
believe that they have intended it.
Id. The committee minutes intimate that actual copies of the Schlenk decision were distributed to the
members of the committee prior to or during the hearing. See id. (Rebuttal Comments of
Representative John Schneider).
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The legal action in this bill is both unecessary [sic] and
redundent [sic]. A suit would be allowed now under present
law because of the definition of injury. Injury shall [mean] an
injury by accident arising out of and in the course of
employment. And, it is obvious that if you intend to hurt
someone it is not an accident. He felt that gross negligence was
defined as the entire want of care, rather than the intent to
cause harm.
The goal of workmen's compensation is to keep employees and
employers out of court. This bill, if passed, would change this.
•. .222

By the narrow vote of nine to seven, the bill was defeated in the
committee and not recommended for approval when presented to the
full House of Representatives for consideration.
B.

A

SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM

As presently constituted, the North Dakota Workers' Compensation
Act allows intentional injuries to be bound by statutory coverage.
Although workers' compensation statutes were expressly drafted to cover
workplace accidents, the legislative scheme in North Dakota arguably
cloaks an intentionally tortious employer or co-employee with virtually
unqualified immunity. The immunity arises, often by sheer happenstance, when an injured worker applies for and receives workers'
compensation benefits.
However inadvertent, the worker places
intentionally injurious conduct within the system's exclusive coverage by
applying for and receiving workers' compensation. The victimized
employee is thereby relegated to this limited recovery and effectively
denied any common law redress. This result is inconsistent with the
terms of the original quid pro quo and is antithetical to the workers'
compensation policy of improving workplace safety. Legislative
revision is necessary in order to restore the integrity of the workers'
compensation system in North Dakota. An amendment to the North
Dakota Workers' Compensation Act which exempts intentionally
injurious conduct, evidencing a state of mind inconsistent with that
found on accidents, from the operation of the exclusive-remedy rule
truly effectuates both the letter and spirit of the compensation bargain.

222. Id. (emphasis added).

1994]

WORKERS' COMPENSATION

Specifically, North Dakota should amend its cumulative-remedy
provision, codified at section 65-01-09 of the North Dakota Century
Code (discussed at Part IV(B)(2) above), and create an exception to the
rule of exclusivity for a narrow category of conduct in order to: 1)
permit an employee to bring a cause of action directly against an
employer or co-worker only for those torts which can be fairly said to
result in an intentionally inflicted injury; and 2) allow that employee to
obtain immediate relief through the compensation statutes while at the
same time permitting the injured employee to pursue a tort action in
order to secure full recovery. This approach provides a more equitable
and definitive solution to the treatment of intentional injuries in North
Dakota and removes the yoke of oppression from the shoulders of
employees who are intentionally injured by providing a vehicle for
recovery from the common-law tort system. It would not force the
plaintiff to an election between remedies. A plaintiff under this
approach may seek certain and immediate relief from workers'
compensation while simultaneously pursuing full compensation through
the courts, with the burdens and defenses attendant to such a proceeding
to operate as a realistic check on vexatious litigation. 22 3 Under this
proposal, a worker intentionally injured need not choose between
benefits under workers' compensation or damages under the common
law, but instead may freely pursue both, because the very same injury is
indeed accidental and intentional. Of course, a plaintiff would be entitled
to one recovery and not have the benefit of both remedies, because the
insurance fund or carrier would be subrogated to any amount collected
to the extent of the workers' compensation benefits paid. 224 The current
statutory scheme in North Dakota provides for this already. Furthermore, the exclusive-remedy provisions themselves are preserved almost
totally intact.
The advantage of a cumulative-remedy theory as outlined above is
that it makes the no-fault workers' compensation benefits, with their
maximum ceiling, the exclusive remedy for the categories of harm
prescribed by the Act, while at the same time allowing the traditional tort

223. Even when the exclusive-remedy provisions of the North Dakota's Workers' Compensation
Act do not preclude a tort claim by an injured worker against an employer or fellow servant, there is
never a guarantee that the worker will be able to prevail in a tort action. The injured worker must first
establish all of the elements of the cause of action by the requisite degree of proof as well as
overcome any applicable defenses. Additionally, a complaint should do more than merely allege an
intentional injury in order to pierce the shield of immunity. It should allege facts sufficient enough to
warrant a finding that the conduct was intentionally injurious. Therefore, a motion to dismiss should
properly be granted if the complaint contains little more than conclusory allegations.
224. The election-of-remedies doctrine is enacted in order to prevent double recovery. Where a
subrogation or set-off mechanism is established, the necessity for the doctrine is questionable.
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remedies to fully compensate an injured worker. A cumulative-remedy
theory best serves.the objectives of both the no-fault and tort systems. It
retains the limitations on liability for those injuries naturally associated
with the business operation and also permits the imposition of tort
liability on those defendants who would otherwise enjoy immunity under
the broad reach of the exclusive-remedy provisions. Further, a plan that
would exact full compensation effectively operates to deter egregious
misconduct while arguably fostering increased job-site safety.
However, in order for the exclusive-remedy rule to fulfill its
intended function, the scope of the rule and the applicability of any
exception should be quite clear, predictable, and limited. The rule should
not be subverted by the operation of an exception such that the
protection it affords becomes illusory. Indeed, the continued vitality of
the rule of exclusivity is integral to the operation of the compensation
system. Care must therefore be taken to restrictively construe the term
"intentional" in order to afford employers with an appropriate measure
of protection and not unduly tip the scales of the compensation balance
in favor of employees. 2 2 5 Any amendment to the North Dakota
Workers' Compensation Act should establish adequate standards and
define what conduct will be considered sufficiently intentional to
2 26
surmount the exclusivity bar.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

The North Dakota Workers' Compensation Act harbors inequities
that must be remedied by legislative action. Further, changes in the law
and the economy since the inauguration of the original bargain have
significantly increased the value of the common law rights that workers
long ago relinquished. A system which imposes upon an assailant, be it
an employer or co-worker, liability for the full costs of those injuries
intentionally inflicted upon an employee, yet protects such individuals
from exorbitant recoveries resulting from inevitable and genuine
accidents, truly effectuates and preserves both the principle of equity as

225. An overly expansive interpretation of an intentional-injury exception would thwart the
purpose of the statutory scheme. However, promulgating a standard so strict that it is essentially
unattainable renders an exception to exclusivity itself illusory.
226. See generally, supra note 146 (setting forth and discussing two definitions of "intentional
injury"). See Kuhnert v. John Morrell & Co. Meat Packing, Inc., 5 F.3d 303, 305 (8th Cir. 1993);
Shearer v. Homestake Mining Co., 727 F.2d 707, 708 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984); Pyle v. Dow Chem. Co., 728
F.2d 1129, 1130 (8th Cir. 1984) (construing the intentional-injury requirement of state statutory
schemes). See also David B. Harrison, Annotation. What Conduct Is Willful Intentional,or Deliberate
Within Workmen's Compensation Act Provision Authorizing Tort Action for Such Conduct, 96 A.L.R.3d
1064 (1979).
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well as the balance and compromise which is at the heart of the workers'
compensation system. A broad interpretation of. workers' compensation
statutes which includes serious misconduct, such as intentional assaults
on employees, within its ambit and then operates to effectively bar a
common-law action cloaks an undeserving assailant with unjustified
immunity. An amendment to the cumulative-remedy provision of the
North Dakota Workers' Compensation Act which incorporates an
exception to the rule of exclusivity for intentionally injurious conduct,
renders the statutory scheme more consonant with the original quid pro
quo.

